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Happiness, The Life of Virtue 
and Friendship: 
Theological Reflections on 
Aristotelian Themes 
STANLEY HAUERWAS 
Part I: On Being Temporally Happy 
THE PROBLEM WITH HAPPINESS 
I am not happy with happiness. I do not trust being happy and I tend not to 
trust happy people. For how can anyone who is happy know what the world is 
like? We live in a world of suffering and tragedy that defies attempts to be 
happy. I especially distrust people who try to be happy because happiness, what-
ever it is, does not seem to be something we can accomplish. The kind of self-
involvement that trying to be happy entails is simply incompatible with the disin-
terestedness which is characteristic of genuinely good people. 
I particularly distrust the notion of happiness when it is associated with reli-
gion. For example, when Christianity is commended as a religion of happiness it 
always seems to lose any critical bite. It becomes a religion promising satisfac-
tion for the well-off such that the radical demands of the gospel are overlooked 
or explained away. As a religion of happiness, Christianity becomes a general 
form of religiosity that is so functionally useful the question of whether it is true 
hardly makes any difference. Moreover, if Christianity is about happiness then 
what are we to make of the repeated and insistent claims that suffering is the 
hallmark of the Christian life? 
Because of this general unhappiness I have tended to avoid the language of 
happiness when thinking or writing about matters moral. This seems a bit odd, 
Stanley Hauerwas, Ph.D., is professor of theological ethics at The Divinity 
School, Duke University. This article is the first in a thn!e-part series, complete in 
this journal. It is followed by a critical n!sponse from Philip L. Quinn, Ph.D., 
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however, as no one has influenced me more that Aristotle, and the Nichomach-
ean Ethics begins and ends with a discussion of happiness. Moreover, accounts 
of the moral life that stress Lhe importance of virtue usually involve a teleological 
account which entails some sense of self-fulfillment. In my attempt to avoid hap-
piness as a theme, therefore, I have used, somewhat arbitrarily, only the middle 
books of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics and have developed an ethic of virtue 
that only promises faithfulness which may accidentally provide a sense of fulfill-
ment. 
Yet I suspect there is something deeply wrong with any attempt to give an 
account of the moral life that avoids happiness or at least makes it a secondary 
phenomenon. It may be that happiness is wrongly thought to be the end of the 
moral !if e, but it is quite another matter to think it has no relevance to living 
well. Moreover, no account of Christian ethics can avoid dealing with happiness, 
not only because it is such a prominent human concern, but also because the 
very nature of the Christian life entails a sense of well-being that is surely not 
entirely unlike what some have meant by happiness. 
My sense of ambiguity about happiness is captured best by two scenes from 
Lhe rccenl movie, Tender Mercies. In Lhe first, Mac Sledge, after being Laid his 
daughter has died, is seen hoeing weeds in his garden. His new wife, who has 
helped him recover some sense of dignity, stands silently at the edge of the gar-
den. Mac, without looking at her, says several times, " I don't believe in happi-
ness." She makes no attempt to persuade him otherwise. Yet the movie closes 
with Mac throwing a football with his young stepson as if nothing else mattered. 
Like Mac, I do not believe in happiness, but I do believe in throwing footballs 
with stepsons. The problem is knowing how to describe the latter as a way of life. 
I am going lo try, therefore, to develop an account of happiness that I hope 
will do justice to our moral experience as well as suggest the role happiness 
might play in the life of those who desire to be Christians. As a way to explore 
the nature and role of happiness in the moral life, I am going to undertake an 
analysis of Aristotle's account of happiness. That turn to Aristotle is not surpris-
ing because it is a common assumption that his account in many ways still re-
mains unsurpassed. I must say, however, that while I hope the analysis I develop 
is true to Aristotle, my primary interest is not interpreting Aristotle correctly--
whatever that would mean. Rather, I am primarily concerned lo use Aristotle to 
further how Christians oughl to think about happiness. In Lhe process, however, I 
hope to suggest why Aristotle's account is still so important--not only for what he 
says but for how his analysis is structured. 
Of particular interest to me is Aristotle's claim that happiness "requires com-
pleteness in virtue as well as a complete lifetime" (1100a3-5).1 Much of what I 
will attempt is to try to understand what such an observation could possibly 
mean. IL is not only unclear what or how we could ever have completeness in 
virtue, but even more puzzling is the claim it takes a complete lifetime. For ex-
am pie, one of the implications of such a claim would seem to be that feeling 
happy is no guarantee we are happy. Put even more strongly, if you think or feel 
you are happy it is a good indication you are in the grip of an illusion or, even 
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worse, are deeply self-deceived. For according to Aristotle, it seems that happi-
ness comes not during, but al the end of our life--thus the fear of untimely death. 
Happiness is the characteristic of those who live in a manner such that the end 
of their Life confirms the way they have lived. As I hope to show, the happy per-
son, thus, is one who can claim their death as their own. 
Objections to such an account of happiness seem obvious since it seems we 
can be sure we are truly happy only when it is too late to enjoy that state. Yet I 
want to show that Aristotle's account of happiness is more plausible than it may 
at first appear. For I think Aristotle is rightly struggling to take account of the 
contingent and temporal character of our existence. That may not seem very sig-
nificant if we fail to acknowledge, either personally or in our moral theory, how 
lime can appear to be the great enemy of morality. For example, just think how, 
on a personal level, what appeared to be so clearly right later appears as pathetic 
if not positively corrupt. So often, both existentially and in theory, morality 
seems to be an attempt to defeat the necessity of such retrospective judgments in 
the hopes of securing moral consistency--a consistency that seems crucial if we 
are to achieve happiness. 
Recognition of the timefulness necessarily means we must deal with questions 
of moral change and continuity. We usually think we ought to do some changing 
in our lives, but it is by no means clear how that conviction is compatible with 
our sense that a person of character has a stability that insures we can trust them 
to be who they are. As we shall see, Aristotle's analysis of the kind of person we 
must be to be capable of true happiness manifests rather than resolves this ambi-
guity. Exactly because his account of happiness does this, I hope to show that it 
is a particularly rich resource for helping understand what it might mean for 
Christians to be happy. 
HAPPINESS AS THE GOOD AND FINAL END 
Where do you begin an analysis of the moral life? It has been the tendency of 
modern ethicists to begin their reflections on morality from as formal and mini-
mal a starting point as possible. They have done so in the hopes of finding a 
foundation for ethics that is non-arbitrary and rationally compelling--that is, one 
not temporally determined. Aristotle begins in quite a different manner. He sim-
ply asks what most people think living life well involves--that is, what is the high-
est good. He suggests that many claim morality is about being happy, and he is 
willing to begin with that assumption. Yet Aristotle, in Socratic fashion, does not 
assume he knows what happiness entails for that is exactly the issue that needs 
investigation. Therefore, Aristotle accepts the common assumption that the 
highest good has to do with happiness only in the hope of tempting us lo follow 
him with an investigation of that claim. We must be careful, therefore, not to 
assume any one statement adequately summarizes Aristotle's views about happi-
ness as he constantly nuances his first formulations by further argument. 
For example, Aristotle begins by observing that though all agree that happi-
ness is the "highest good attainable by action," when they try to define happiness 
there is little agreement. Many say that happiness is some pleasure and/or 
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wealth; some identify happiness with different things at different times (thus, 
when sick it is health, when poor it is wealth, and so on); and some, the more 
cultivated who have thought about such matters, think happiness cannot consist 
in a list of goods but must be a good in and of itself which is the cause of all 
these goods (1095a20-30). Obviously the initial agreement on happiness as the 
"highest good" requires further analysis in order to be plausible. 
Yet it is important to note that Aristotle does not assume that such analysis 
can be successful by ignoring what people actually want and desire. Happiness is 
not the result, as later Stoic thinkers would claim, of the eradication of desire. 
We will not be happy, according to Aristotle, if we purge our lives of all desires, 
but only when we desire the right things rightly. But even the most cultivated 
desires, such as that for honor, cannot bring happiness since honor depends on 
the opinions of others. Therefore, to be happy, Aristotle suggests we must desire 
that which cannot easily be taken away from us (1095b25-28). 
As we shall see, this is a particularly important aspect of Aristotle's account of 
happiness. For though he says it can only be a "guess," at this point he continues 
to assume that happiness must be that which we cannot lose either through the 
actions of others or by outrageous fate. Thus he maintains that the happy person 
will have the attribute of permanence and he will remain happy 
throughout his life. For he will always or to the highest degree both do 
and contemplate what is in conformity with virtue; he will bear the 
vicissitudes of fortune most nobly and with perfect decorum under all 
circumstances, inasmuch as he is truly good and "four-square beyond 
reproach" (1100b16-23). 
Even more strongly he argues that 
no supremely happy man can even become miserable, for he will never 
do what is hateful and base. For in our opinion, the man who is truly 
good and wise will bear with dignity whatever fortune may bring, and 
will always act as nobly as circumstances permit, just as a good general 
makes the most strategic use of the troops at his disposal, and a good 
shoemaker makes the best shoe he can from the leather available, and 
so on with experts in all other fields (1100b35-1101a6). 
Yet Aristotle notes that there are reversals in fortune that can happen even to 
the happy man that can prevent him from being "supremely happy." Thus in 
Book Seven he says, 
those who assert that a man is happy even on the rack and even when 
great misfortunes befall him, provided he is good, are talking nonsense, 
whether they know it or not. Since happiness also needs fortune, some 
people regard good fortune as identical with happiness. But that is not 
true, for even good fortune, if excessive, can be an obstruction; perhaps 
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we are, in that case, no longer justified in calling it "good fortune," for 
its definition is determined by its relation to happiness (1153b20-24). 
We thus have an increasingly complex picture. Aristotle accepts the general 
assumption that happiness is the satisfaction of desire, but the question of the 
kind of desire we should have to be happy is not easily determined. He suggests 
that it must be a desire for that which is not easily lost, that is, that which will not 
be subject to the fortunes or time; yet it is unclear what could possibly satisfy 
such a demand. 
In order to investigate this issue we must return to Aristotle's claim that hap-
piness is the final end. As we have seen, Aristotle begins his account of happi-
ness assuming that happiness has to do with an end, that is, the highest good 
attainable by action. This assumption reflects his general view that "all knowl-
edge and every choice is directed toward some good" (1095a15). Every human 
activity has some good such that 
it is one thing in medicine, another in strategy, and another again in 
each of the arts. What, then, is the good of each? Is it not that for the 
sake of which everything else is done? That means it is health in the 
case of medicine, victory in the case of strategy, a house in the case of 
building, a different thing in the case of different arts, and in all actions 
and choices it is the end. For it is for the sake of the end that all else is 
done. Thus, if there is some one end for all that we do, this would be the 
good attainable by actions; if there are several ends, they will be the 
good attainable by action (1097a17-24). 
It is important to note the conditional in the last sentence, for Aristotle at this 
point does not assume that there is any one end for all that we do. He notes that 
it is obvious that there are many ends--e.g., wealth, health, power--that are 
means to something else. Thus, it is not obvious that all ends are final, but if 
there is one good it must be something final. But what would it mean for such an 
end to be final? It is an end, he suggests, that can be pursued for itself and not 
for something else. It is not a means to anything. And such a description seems 
to apply to happiness above all else: 
for we always choose happiness as an end in itself and never for the 
sake of something else. Honor, pleasure, intelligence, and all virtue we 
choose partly for themselves--for we would choose each of them even if 
no further advantage would accrue from them--but we also choose them 
partly for the sake of happiness because we assume that it is through 
them that we will be happy. On the other hand, no one chooses 
happiness for the sake of honor, pleasure, and the like, nor as a means 
to anything at all (1097bl-7). 
Such a claim, however, is anything but obvious. Is Aristotle suggesting that 
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happiness is dominant in the sense that everything that we do is ultimately done 
for it? If so, such a view seems to presuppose a view of human action that is 
clearly mistaken. I may jog to lose weight, and I may desire to lose weight to 
better my health, and I may desire to better my health in order to live longer, 
and I may desire to live longer because--well, I am not sure why I desire to live 
longer. The reason I am not sure why I desire to live longer is not simply be-
cause I lack a clear aim in my life that requires more time, but because "desiring 
to live longer" is a complex set of desires that involves everything from wanting 
to see the Cubs win a World Series to enjoying a friendship. To describe the fi-
nal end in such a singular manner simply fails to do justice to the complex nature 
of our desires. 
Moreover, there simply seems to be something wrong about Aristotle's as-
sumption that one action is always a means to something else. I may jog, even as 
boring as jogging is, for my health, but it is by no means clear that my jogging 
can best be described as a "means" at all. On the contrary, I jog because I like to 
jog. While I am glad that jogging can result in better health, the reason that I jog 
cannot be so easily explained. Indeed, any explanation for jogging, like any ac-
count of why we should desire to live longer, necessarily turns out to be complex. 
Before we get too taken with such criticism, however, I think we need to re-
consider what Aristotle is trying to say. Certainly Aristotle is not suggesting that 
simply because every action has an end, even if that end is itself, that therefore 
all actions have a common end. Nor is he suggesting, though it is easy to be mis-
led here by his examples, that there is some particular act to whose end all oth-
ers are subordinate.2 Rather we must be particularly careful to note why Aris-
totle calls happiness a "final" good for he does not mean happiness is one 
among others. The point is that happiness, rather than being analogous to other 
goods we desire, is different in the sense it is sufficient in itself. And by "self-suf-
ficient" he means that "which taken by itself makes life something desirable and 
deficient in nothing" (1097b15). 
The criticism I made above of Aristotle's suggestion that all our activities are 
a means to the end of our happiness turns out to be misplaced. For this is exactly 
the notion Aristotle needs to display how happiness is a final end. As Ackrill 
says, 
Eudaimonia--what all men want--is not the result or outcome of a 
lifetime's effort; it is not something to look forward to (like a contented 
retirement), it is a life, enjoyable and worthwhile all through. Various 
bits of it must themselves be enjoyable and worthwhile, not just means 
for bringing about subsequent bits. That the primary ingredients of 
eudaimonia for the sake of eudaimonia is not incompatible with their 
being ends in themselves; for eudaimonia is constituted by activities that 
are ends in themselves.3 
Only if eudaimonia has such a character could it be a good that cannot easily be 
taken away from us. Indeed, that is why it might even be possible to be happy on 
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the rack even though by being such we may not be supremely happy. 
If this is the case, then we can see why many commentators on Aristotle resist 
translating eudaimonia as happiness. For happiness is not an "end" that can be 
pursued or achieved separately from the kind of life we lead. Our life is not a 
means to some end called happiness. Rather eudaimonia is the name Aristotle 
gives to "the best possible life,'"' which means it is impossible to abstract the 
meaning of happiness from the display of such a life--thus the virtues. We can 
now understand why since it is not so much an end or a way of life. But if not 
one end among others, how is such a way to be specified? How are we to under-
stand the material content of happiness so construed? To answer these ques-
tions, we must turn to Aristotle's understanding of the ergon (function) of man. 
WHAT EUDAJMONIA IS AND HOW IT IS ACQUIRED 
The ever-candid Aristotle observed that it is "perhaps a little trite" to call eu-
daimonia the highest good and a clearer account is still required. He suggests 
that perhaps this can best be done by asking what is the proper function (ergon) 
of man {lo<J7b21-25). 
For just as the goodness and performance of a flute player, a sculptor, 
or any kind of expert, and generally of anyone who fulfills some function 
or performs some action, are thought to reside in his proper function, so 
the goodness and performance of man would seem to reside in his 
proper function (lo<J7b25-30). 
Aristotle's appeal to "function" at this point in his argument has often been 
criticized as viciously circular or as an unnecessary piece of metaphysics, since it 
only results in telling us that certain excellences are essential for happiness.5 
Moreover, some have taken him to mean that the "good of man" that correlates 
with his function is a single thing in a manner that excludes all other goods. 
However, the latter criticism is clearly wrong. Aristotle, as I have tried to sug-
gest, assumes that there are many different goods for man. Again, I think it is 
crucial that we not be misled by Aristotle's appeal to "a function," by remember-
ing that he only proposes it as a way to explore further the nature of happiness 
as a characteristic of all our activities. 
To discover man's proper function Aristotle notes that just as the eye, hand, 
or foot has its proper function, so must man have some function over and above 
the functions of his various parts. That function cannot be just living as he has 
that in common with the plants. Nor is man's function that of perception, as he 
has that in common with every animal. That leaves 
an active life of the rational element. The rational element has two 
parts: one is rational in that it obeys the rule of reason, the other in that 
it possesses and conceives rational rules. Since the expression 'life of the 
rational element' also can be used in two senses, we must make it clear 
that we mean a life determined by the activity, as opposed to the mere 
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possession, of the rational element. For the activity, it seems, has a 
greater claim to be the function of man. The proper function of man, 
then, consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational 
principle or, at least, not without it (1098a2-8) . 
Again many have found fault with Aristotle's concentration on " reason" as 
the distinguishing mark of the human. It is often pointed out that there are 
countless things people do besides reasoning. Moreover, if there is any distinct-
iveness to human activity qua human activity, it does not reside in any one 
"mark"; but rather consists in the complex ways people have learned to coordi-
nate the capacities and skills they share with all life. While Aristotle's use of the 
language of function leaves him open to such criticism, it is clear, I think, that he 
does not mean to suggest that the many things which people do are inconsequen-
tial to understanding human activity. Rather his point is the more simple--
namely that "rationality'' is simply not one activity among others that men do, 
but it is the activity that pervades all we do. Indeed it is exactly that power that 
allows us to coordinate the many capacities and skills we possess.6 
Moreover, once having made the suggestion that the distinctively human is 
exhibited in our rational activity, Aristotle proceeds immediately to muddy those 
already cloudy waters. He says that by "proper function" he means the same 
kind as the function of an individual who sets high standards for himself: thus the 
proper function of a harpist is that of one who has set high standards for himself 
(1098a8-10). Therefore "rational activity'' is not some minimum possessed by all, 
though all men have the potential to possess it, but rather it is a high standard 
that is a mark of distinction. 
Thus in a summary passage Aristotle says, 
On these assumptions, if we take the proper function of man to be a 
certain kind of life, and if this kind of life is an activity of the soul and 
consists in actions performed in conjun.ction with the rational element, 
and if a man of high standards is he who performs these actions well 
and properly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in 
accordance with the excellence appropriate to it; we reach the 
conclusion that the good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity 
with the best and most complete. But we must add 'in a complete life.' 
For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one sunny day; 
similarly, one day or a short time does not make a man blessed and 
happy (1098a12-20). 
So, rationality as the function of man is but the means Aristotle uses to note 
the whole set of virtues man needs to live well over the span of a life. For even 
though Aristotle distinguishes between theoretical and practical reason, and 
later suggests that contemplation is the form of life that most nearly approaches 
happiness (1177b24-26), he in fact assumes that practical reason is as much the 
source of happiness as the theoretical. Indeed it seems odd that he should sug-
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gest that the practical life is happy only in a secondary sense (1178a9); while he 
bases his claim of the superiority of contemplation on its similarity to the gods 
(1178b25-30), that would make man's happiness based on an attribute which is 
not in his power, which is not his own function. Perhaps that is why Aristotle says 
that "happiness is some kind of study or contemplation," (1178b31) thus leaving 
vague the kind of activity he takes as his ideal. 
Aristotle's emphasis on contemplation as the highest ideal certainly gives 
good grounds for those who would criticize him for an overly intellectual account 
of human activity. Yet such criticism fails to note the life of contemplation is im-
possible if we are not first living a virtuous life that entails the whole great gamut 
of human activities. Moreover, Aristotle never loses his good sense, for even 
though he is attracted to contemplation because of its promise of self-sufficiency, 
yet he maintains even the contemplative man 
will need external well-being, since we are only human. Our nature is 
not self-sufficient for engaging in study: our body must be healthy and 
we must have food and generally be cared for. Nevertheless, if it is not 
possible for a man lo be supremely happy without external goods, we 
must not think that his needs will be great and many in order to be 
happy; for self-sufficiency and moral action do not consist in an excess 
(of possessions) (1178b31-1179a22; see also, 1099a30-32). 
The significance of these last considerations has often been overlooked by 
those who criticize Aristotle's account of happiness as too intellectualistic. As I 
have tried to suggest, happiness for Aristotle is not some single activity 
to whose end the needs of all other human activities should be 
subordinated. He is not saying that there is some one end, the same 
one, of all particular actions. Virtuous activity or living humanly well do 
not signify one thing because there are different kinds of virtue and our 
happiness or perfection or ultimate end is constituted, not by some one 
virtue, but to the degree this is possible by them all.7 
Happiness, it turns out, is thus a name of a set of virtuous activities. As Aristotle 
says,"eudaimonia is some kind of activity of the soul in conformity with virtue. 
All the other goods are either necessary prerequisites for happiness, or are by 
nature co-workers with it and useful instruments for attaining it" (1099b25-28). 
But why then all the emphasis on "rationality as the function of man" and the 
corresponding suggestion that contemplation promises to be our best chance for 
happiness? Aristotle's own account of the complexity of practical reason cer-
tainly provides little basis for the assumption that theoretical reason is superior. 
Indeed, from the point of view of how we must actually live our lives, the moral 
virtues and the virtues of the practical intellect take precedence over those of the 
theoretical. Our final end, therefore, is not some particular good among others 
but is "constituted by a plurality of virtuous activities."8 
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I think one of the reasons Aristotle emphasized so strongly the importance of 
reason and contemplation as the ultimate form of the happy life was due to his 
haunting sense of the effect of time and fortune on the moral life.9 For contem-
plation, thinking on those things that cannot be other than they are, seems to 
promise the kind of permanence that can make us impervious to outrageous 
fate. Yet he never assumed that contemplation was sufficient to insure an eu-
daemonistic life since what finally makes such a life possible, even one of con-
templation, is our having a character sufficient to bear the vicissitudes of fortune 
nobly (1100b17-21).10 As I noted above, Aristotle was keenly aware that frequent 
reverses can crush even the supremely happy. Only those who are noble and 
high-minded cannot be changed by such reverses, not because they are insensi-
tive to pain, but because, as he says, they will never do what is hateful and base 
(1100b28-35). 
Only if we are persons of virtue, therefore, is it possible for us to be happy 
through time.11 We cannot have happiness unless we have acquired the virtues 
necessary to be people of character. To have character means we have a history 
that allows us to make our lives our own. In contrast, bad people cannot be 
happy for they "do not have the element of constancy" and thus do not "remain 
similar even to themselves" (1159b5-8). Goodness, as determined through the 
virtues, provides the skill necessary for us to be steady through the good and bad 
fortune of our lives. Thus, happiness is not so much acquired as it is discovered 
in the process of living virtuously. 
That is why I suspect Aristotle cannot quite make up his mind whether happi-
ness is a gift or is acquired. For, as he says, 
if there is anything at all which comes to me as a gift from the gods, it is 
reasonable to suppose that happiness above all else is god-given; and of 
all things human it is the most likely to be god-given; inasmuch as it is 
the best. But although this subject is perhaps more appropriate to a 
different field of study, it is clear that happiness is one of the most 
divine things, even if it is not god-sent but attained through virtue and 
some kind of learning or training. And if it is better that happiness is 
acquired in this way rather than by chance, it is reasonable to assume 
that this is the way it is acquired .... To leave the greatest and noblest of 
things to chance would hardly be right (1109b10-25). u 
Perhaps now we are in a position to understand better why Aristotle insists 
that happiness requires completeness in virtue as well as a complete life. For in 
spite of his talk of happiness as the final end, we see happiness is not some ideal 
which is realizable only in the distant future. Indeed happiness is not so much an 
end, but the way. Happiness is the sense of self that comes from having acquired 
the virtues necessary to transverse the dangers and opportunities of our exis-
tence--dangers and opportunities that are intrinsic to the timeful character of 
our existence. Thus, happiness is not something that can be accomplished all at 
once. Rather it seems to be more like the ability to look back over our life and 
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be glad it is ours--in short, unless we have acq\Jired a history, a life capable of 
narration, we have nothing about which to be happy. That is why happiness may 
not be possible for the young, as they have not yet lived long enough, they have 
not acquired the virtues necessary, even to know what it means to say they are 
happy. Yet that is also why Aristotle thinks it so crucial to initiate the young into 
the life of virtue. For only such a life can give us the skill to look back truthfully 
and still claim our life as our own.13 
ON BEING HAPPILY A CHRISTIAN 
A fuller understanding of Aristotle's account of happiness obviously requires 
a discussion of the virtues and friendship. However, on the basis of the analysis 
of happiness I think some tentative theological observations can be made. As I 
suggested at the beginning, I think Aristotle can help us understand in what way 
it makes sense for Christians not only to be happy, but to desire to be happy. Let 
me now try to say why that is the case. 
Some may feel that all this is a false problem. Of course Christians can and 
should be happy. After all, they are just like anyone else. If being Christian does 
not contribute to our happiness, what good is it? Yet many in the Christian tradi-
tion have challenged just that assumption. They have done so because of their 
fundamental conviction that the gospel is meant to challenge, if not destroy, our 
presumptions about what will make us happy in this life. Christianity does not 
promise fulfillment, but rather a way to live in the world truthfully and without 
illusion. It is, after all, a little hard to believe that a people who take as their 
central belief a crucified God can believe that life is finally about happiness. 
From such a perspective, Christian convictions are more nearly true not because 
they underwrite our assumptions about what constitutes human fulfillment, but 
because Christianity challenges our facile presumptions that God is primarily 
concerned with our happiness. 
Therefore many Christian writers have suggested that suffering rather than 
happiness is the hallmark of the Christian life. While the Christian is certainly 
not encouraged to seek out bad fortune, at least for some, a bit of bad luck is 
seen as a positive aid for learning to live as a Christian. For such suffering tests 
the genuineness of the Christian's conviction that they live not for their own 
glory, but that of God. 
There is no doubt that there is something right about this emphasis. More-
over, in a culture like our own that seems bent on the satisfaction of every desire 
no matter how shallow, such a challenge appears positively salutary. In a time 
when the desire of many for happiness results in a desperate devaluing of all 
questions of significance, any challenge to the superficiality of our desires seems 
more likely right than wrong. 
Yet there also seems something wrong with any account of the Christian life 
that denies all moral significance to happiness. For the salvation wrought in Je-
sus of Nazareth, we believe, offers a new way of life that certainly brings with it a 
sense of satisfaction. The issue is how that satisfaction is to be understood. And 
in this respect I think that Aristotle is a critical resource. 
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Aristotle reminds us that happiness is not so much a goal as a way; or perhaps 
more accurately, happiness but names the kind of a person we must be if we are 
to face the nature of this existence with courage and faithfulness. In this sense, 
Aristotle helps us understand why we rightly understand the kind of life we are 
called to live as Christians as a journey rather than an answer. For what we are 
offered as Christians is not a formula for successful living, but a way to go on 
such that we will be able to look back over our lives with a sense of satisfaction--
that is, happily. 
Let me put it this way. One of the difficulties of taking up any significant way 
of life is that we never adequately understand what we are doing. Significant 
commitments are asked of us that we are not in a position to appreciate when we 
first undertake them. For example, we never know what we are doing when we 
get married.14 Indeed, you do not even know what kind of commitment you have 
made until you can look back on it twenty years later. You do not even know 
what it would mean to call a marriage happy until you have lived it for many 
years. But if that is the case then why would we ever undertake such a life? We 
do so, I think, because we do not know what we are doing. 
But what if the same is true of taking on the story of being a Christian? Most 
of us have done so not knowing what we were doing. In effect, our being Chris-
tian is more a matter of fortune than something we have done. We may regret or 
rejoice that we are so identified, but there seems little we can do about our hav-
ing been identified. But if Aristotle is right, that is the character of life itself. 
There is no way to avoid the temporal character of our existence. Our desire for 
happiness forces us to be one thing and not another. Yet fhat very desire also 
becomes the way that we can test the authenticity of the concrete embodiment of 
that desire. For any truthful way of life must admit as well as promise an answer 
to the question--"Are you happy?"15 
I take it that fundamental to Christian convictions is the assurance that any-
one who has followed the way of life we call Christianity will be able to look back 
on their life and say, " I would not have it otherwise." And to say this is the hap-
piest thing anyone can say, if they say it truthfully and without self-deception. 
Therefore, Aristotle's account of happiness helps us understand the structure of 
Christian convictions insofar as he helps us understand in what manner they 
make us happy. 
The difference between Aristotle and Christianity is not that the one teaches 
us to desire happiness and the other does not. Rather, I think we will find the 
profoundest difference is the kind of person we must be if we are to be capable 
of happiness. For Aristotle, it seems we can only be happy if we achieve a self-
sufficiency that guards us against outrageous fortune. The Christian claim that 
our lives can be satisfying only to the extent they are formed in reference to a 
concrete historical individual could only strike Aristotle as the height of absurd-
ity. For that is to make our happiness depend on a historically contingent start-
ing point, a piece of luck, that we cannot control. Yet it is the claim of Christians 
that only when we learn to live our lives on that basis will we be on the way to 
living a life of happiness. 
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To return to the point I made at the beginning, it is the Christian claim that to 
the extent we learn to have our lives determined by the God we find in Jesus of 
Nazareth will we have the resource to make our deaths our own. Moreover, it is 
that resource that gives us the power to stand against the world whose power 
derives from its false promises to give our lives significance. In contrast, Chris-
tians claim that our death, even untimely, cannot be robbed of meaning, for God 
has in fact insured our life and death through the cross and resurrection of 
Christ. Thus we can die confident that we will be remembered by those future 
generations God will caJ1 to be His Church. Doesn't that sound like good news? 
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Part II: The Virtues of Happiness 
WHY HAPPINESS REQUIRES THE VIRTUES 
We begin by wanting to be happy, but to be so, at least according to Aristotle, 
we are led to a life of virtue.1 It seems any happiness worth having is that which a 
person of worth achieves. But achieves is almost too strong a word; it sounds as 
if we can become happy by following a set of prescriptions at the end of which 
happiness is guaranteed. The problem with such a view, however, is that the vir-
tues are not just the means to happiness, they are the form of happiness itself. 
Aristotle's account of happiness presupposes the temporal character of our 
lives. One swallow does not make a spring any more than one good act (or even 
one good day) makes us morally worthy. Aristotle, therefore, is struggling to un-
derstand what is necessary to sustain us for the long haul. Put in my language, 
we are on a journey, or more accurately, the self is a journey. But if that is the 
case, then what do we need in order to prepare for living a life that, in a sense, 
never stops? 
Perhaps the significance of this can be made clear by asking you to consider 
the difference between going on a trip and undertaking a journey. When I go on 
a trip, I know where I am going, how long it will take, what preparations I need 
to make, and what I am going to do or hope to accomplish. When I undertake a 
journey, I often have only a hazy idea of where I am going, how long it will take, 
how to prepare, or what I hope to accomplish. Thus, I make trips to Texas, but if 
I were to go to India it would be ajoumey. (Of course, for some, going to Texas 
would be more like a journey.) 
Our metaphorical use of trip and journey illustrates their differences. We say 
some experiences were a "trip" which means they were different, interesting, 
and a bit unusual. But as a "trip" they leave no lasting impression and we know 
when they are over. Thus anyone who suggests that "life is a trip" is making a 
significant claim that it's fun but nothing you ought to take too seriously. We 
think it more appropriate to suggest that life is a journey, for that suggests more 
than a movement from one place to another, but rather a development over time 
where I may make no physical movements but go through significant changes. 
To a large extent recent moral philosophy, in an attempt to articulate the 
working moral presumptions of our culture, has tried to depict the moral life 
more as a trip than a journey.2 Ethics is a matter of having a clear idea of where 
you want to go and working out the means to get there. Therefore the proper 
business of ethics is to concentrate on decisions and their justifications. Typical 
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moral "issues" lie behind questions such as: What should we do when we have 
ten patients suffering from kidney disease and only seven dialysis machines? or, 
Is abortion wrong? Or, What is wrong with sex before marriage? Such questions 
are hard, but we feel that we can throw light on such matters by rigorous analy-
sis. Life is a series of such decisions. Life is a trip. 
Our concentration on this aspect of our lives has led us, however, to overlook 
the fact that our lives are not constituted by such decisions. Rather our decisions, 
or even more importantly, those matters we do not subject to decisions, reflect 
fundamental dispositions and orientations that form our lives. For example, most 
of us think it good to be kind, but being kind is not the result of some decision 
we have made. Rather kindness derives from our having certain "overall" aims 
that constitute what our lives are about. But how are we to understand the status 
of such aims and their place in our lives? Al least to ask that question is to begin 
to appreciate why morally we cannot avoid thinking of life as a journey. 
Aristotle's means of trying to get a handle on the language of overall aims was 
through a discussion of the virtues.3 The virtues for Aristotle are a set of excel-
lences that help us become the kind of person who is capable of respect. The 
virtues are those skills that provide the means for us to have the stability of self 
so that happiness is a characteristic of our lives rather than the achievement of 
objects of satisfaction. Therefore the question of whether the good life is or can 
be happy can be answered only by asking, "Happy for whom?" The only happi-
ness worth having is that which the person of worth, the person of virtue, has. 
But we must remember that the virtues are not simply given. They are not 
like the luggage we need in order to go on a trip. Rather the virtues are what 
they are because we do not know where we are going. We do not know where we 
are going because the very virtues necessary to begin the journey are crucial to 
its outcome--that is, they are intrinsic to the end. So, we can only know what we 
have become retrospectively. Therefore, we cannot know what kind of happiness 
we desire until we have acquired the virtues. 
It is to Aristotle's account of the virtues that we must now turn. 
ON BECOMING VIRTUOUS 
Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not try to establish a set of central virtues corre-
sponding to different aspects of the soul. Indeed as we read Aristotle we are 
naturally drawn to Plato's account of courage, temperance, justice and wisdom 
as it gives us a sense of order and balance in comparison to Aristotle's more cha-
otic account of the virtues. Aristotle's lists of the virtues include not only the 
above, but also generosity, magnificence, highmindedness, a nameless virtue be-
tween ambition and lack of ambition, gentleness, truthfulness, wittiness, justice 
and friendship. He makes no attempt to suggest a hierarchy or priority of the 
virtues, though his treatment of courage and temperance in relation to his gen-
eral analysis of virtue and choice seems to suggest they have a significance the 
others do not. Yet he never explicitly suggests what such a significance might in-
volve. Though one assumes that a person of virtue might be deficient in a par-
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ticular virtue--Like gentleness--there is no way they could be virtuous without 
courage or temperance. 
Aristotle's account of the mean, moreover, is not sufficient to counter the sus-
picion that his choice of the virtues is arbitrary. We feel that he had made up his 
mind what virtues he wanted to commend and what kind of person be took as his 
ideal before ever developing the virtues as a mean between various extremes. 
His own account of the mean is enough to sustain such a critique because, on 
analysis, the mean turns out to be extremely complex. Virtue is not some ab-
stract mean that can be established in the abstract, but 
is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is m emotions and 
actions that excess, deficiency, and the median are found. Thus we can 
experience fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and generally any kind 
of pleasure and pain either too much or too little, and in either case not 
properly. But to experience all this at the right time, toward the right 
objects, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the right 
manner--that is the median and the best course, the course that is a 
mark of virtue (1106b15-23). 
The virtues which Aristotle analyzes are not so much "a mean" as they are the 
kind of characteristics he thinks necessary to be the kind of person who feels the 
right things rightly. 
If we look more closely at Aristotle's account of the individual virtues, our dif-
ficulties multiply. For example, Aristotle says that a generous man is character-
ized by giving to the right people rather than by taking from the right and not 
taking from the wrong sources. Excellence consists in doing rather than having 
good done to one, in performing noble actions rather than in not performing 
base ones (1120a10-l5). Thus a person who is good is "not one to accept good 
turns lightly" (1120a35). This same kind of note is continued in Aristotle's ac-
count of high-mindedness; that is, one who is worthy of honor because of his ex-
cellence and good fortune is the kind of person who will do good but is 
"ashamed to accept a good turn, because the former marks a man as superior, 
the latter as inferior" (1124b8-10). Such a man is reluctant to ask for any favor 
but readily offers aid. 
It is easy to criticize Aristotle's account of such a man and his corresponding 
virtues from our perspective. Indeed we are almost tempted to make fun of such 
an "ideal" when Aristotle tells us that such a person will have a slow gait, "a 
deep voice, and a deliberate way of speaking. For a man who takes few things 
seriously is unlikely to be in a hurry, and a person who regards nothing as great 
is not one to be excitable. But a shrill voice and a swift gait are due to hurry and 
(1125a12-16). This is clearly someone most of us would prefer not 
:o know. 
But such a judgment is premature if we try to appreciate the problem Aris-
otle is trying to address. What is crucial for the life of virtue is a certain kind of 
;ufficiency that we might call integrity or constancy.4 Thus, in a passage more 
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likely to appeal to our sensibilities, Aristotle says the high-minded 
is not a gossip, for he will talk neither about himself nor about others, 
since he is not interested in hearing himself praised or others run down. 
Nor again is he given to praise; and for the same reason he does not 
speak evil of others, not even of his enemies, except to scorn them. 
When he encounters misfortunes that are unavoidable or insignificant, 
he will not lament and ask for help. That kind of attitude belongs to 
someone who takes such matters seriously. He is a person who will 
rather possess beautiful and profitless objects than objects which are 
profitable and useful, for they mark him more as self-sufficient (1125a5-
12). 
It is a mistake to let ourselves be misled into dismissing Aristotle's account of 
the virtues because of our distaste for the outward manifestations he associates 
with the high-minded. Behind his account of the high-minded lies an essential 
insight about virtue--namely, the virtuous are such only because their virtue de-
rives from, as well as is formed by, a certain kind of steadfastness of character. 
That such should be the case is not surprising if, as I have suggested, Aristotle's 
account of eudaemonia can be displayed by the notion of journey.5 Knowing we 
are necessarily on a way but unsure of where we are ultimately headed means we 
must be well prepared for the undertaking. To be prepared means we must have 
a center that is not easily destroyed by the good or evil fortune we are bound to 
meet along the way. Aristotle's account of the high-minded is but an attempt to 
suggest the kind of character necessary to be able to feel the right things rightly 
as well as act at the right time, in the right way and toward the right people. 
The difference between the arts and the virtues illustrates the necessity of 
such character for the life of virtue. In the arts, excellence lies in the results 
themselves; but in matters of virtue an act is not just or temperate unless the 
agent has certain characteristics as he performs it: "first of all, he must know 
what he is doing; secondly, he must choose to act the way he does, and he must 
choose it for its own sake; and in the third place, the act must spring from a firm 
and unchangeable character" (1105a26-35). Acts that appear to be just and self-
controlled cannot properly be called such without reference to the person who 
has performed them: "The just and self-controlled man is not he who pe rforms 
these acts, but he who also performs them in the way just and self-controlled 
men do" (1105b7-9). We cannot become courageous by slavishly imitating the 
actions we associate with courage, but we must be the kind of person who is ca-
pable of acting courageously. 
Aristotle contends, therefore, 
that people may perform just acts without actually being just men, as in 
the case of people who do what bas been laid down by the laws but do 
so either involuntarily or through ignorance or for an ulterior motive, 
and not for the sake of performing just acts. {Such persons are not just 
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men) despite the fact that they act the way they should, and perform all 
the actions which a morally good man ought to perform. On the other 
hand, it seems that it is possible for a man to be of such a character that 
he performs each particular act in a way as to make him a good man 
(1144a12-18). 
That a person of virtue is able to act so that each act contributes to his being a 
good man is the result that the action proceeds from a "firm and unchangeable 
character" so that the act is done for its own sake--that, I think, is what Aristotle 
is trying to get at through his depiction of the high-minded. 
But what does it mean for an act to be done for its own sake and why should 
that be a mark of character? Aristotle does not try to answer that question as he 
assumes that it is obvious--namely, we become good by doing what good and just 
people do. Yet more needs to be said if we are to understand why this is the 
case. On Aristotle's account we seem caught in a circle not easily resolved--if vir-
tuous actions require us to be persons of character, yet we can have such charac-
ter only as we have acquired the virtues, then from whence does our character 
come that allows us to act virtuously? To suggest that our actions must be done 
for their own sake is not sufficient, since it is by no means clear what that would 
mean since the description of the action must include some account of " results." 
The circular nature of Aristotle's account is only complicated by his extremely 
nuanced account of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom, like virtue, is not gov-
erned by the attempt to secure or accomplish some result. Nor is it like science, 
since it deals with matters that "admit of being other than they are" (1140b2). 
Practical wisdom aims at good actions as an end in itself, but that is why we can-
not have such wisdom without "self-control." Self-control "preserves" practical 
wisdom since, in matters that depend on judgment, pleasure and pain can de-
stroy or pervert every conviction we hold. We can only become self-controlled if 
we act with practical wisdom, but we cannot possess such wisdom unless we are 
self-controlled (1140bll-20). 
Within the terms with which Aristotle is working, I think there is no satisfying 
account that may alleviate the circularity he seems unable to avoid. That does 
not mean, however, that he is without resources to counter certain kinds of ob-
jections, particularly if we attend to his suggestion that actions that contribute to 
our moral goodness must spring from a "firm and unchangeable character." It is 
that which makes possible our ability to know and choose what we are doing as 
well as doing it for its own sake. But asking that we "know what we are doing" is 
an extraordinary demand, for seldom do we really know what we are doing. Of-
ten we only "know" what we have done long after we have done it. By "know," 
however, I think Aristotle means we must be able to describe what we are doing 
honestly as what we are doing in terms of our ongoing life as a person of virtue.6 
Thus, I cannot try to avoid the demands of my friends and still think of myself as 
generous. To be generous requires that I steadfastly face the demands of being 
generous and will that as my own, as I would not choose to be other. Moreover, 
that is why I can choose to act in no other way, for if I did I would not be who I 
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am. Thus, I can only be generous if I do not have to will or try to be such. 
Put simply, Aristotle's account of the kind of behavior characteristic of a per-
son of virtue is that of a person at ease with him or herself. In a sense, the lan-
guage of self-sufficiency is misleading, for the virtuous are not persons who need 
nothing, but rather they are ones who are satisfied with what they have done be-
cause they know it is how they should act if they are to be virtuous. In short, they 
can act the way they do because they are happy. What they do is not duty for 
duty's sake; instead there is an ease to their behavior that reflects their desire to 
be nothing other than what they are. Happiness, therefore, becomes one of our 
essential checks against self-deception--the difficulty is that it is also one of our 
greatest temptations to self-deception. 
To be a person of character, therefore, cannot be attained by simply trying to 
attain all the virtues Aristotle lists, though they are obviously significant for a 
person of character. Just as we can no more become virtuous by doing one virtu-
ous act after another, neither can we become persons of character by some mix-
ture of the various virtues. To be sure, the individual virtues have a particular 
telos that direct us, but that is just the problem. The various virtues pull in differ-
ent directions and may in fact conflict (the gentle person may well be tempted 
not to press strongly claims of justice, and so on). Of course, Aristotle in prin-
ciple denies such conflicts since everything is finally a matter of judgment. Thus, 
gentleness is not the absence of anger or conflict, but describes one who is angry 
only under the right circumstances and for as long as reason demands (1125b31-
35). But this only reminds us that if the various virtues are to constitute a single 
life we must be, in Aristotle's terms, persons of character.7 
But whence does such character come? In what sense can we be said to be 
responsible for the development of such character if our very ability to be agents 
in the first place depends on our having character? The individual virtues may be 
acquired by engaging in certain kinds of activities since a "given kind of activity 
produces a corresponding character" (1114a8). But there is no one activity that 
corresponds to character, so character is not on all fours with the other virtues. 
Our character is determined by the end, and, finally, that is 
not determined by the choice of the individual himself, but by a natural 
gift of vision, as it were, which enables him to make correct judgments 
and to choose what is truly good: to be well endowed by nature means 
to have this natural gift. For to be well and properly provided by nature 
with the greatest and noblest of gifts, a gift which can be got or learned 
from no one else, but which is one's possession in the form in which 
nature has given it: that is the meaning of being well endowed by nature 
in the full and true sense of the word (1114b5-11). 
But then how can we be said to be responsible for our character? 
Though I think that Aristotle provides no satisfactory answer to this question, 
we can be helped toward a solution if we remember the temporal character of 
the moral life. Aristotle does not assume we acquire all the virtues all at once. 
Atistotelian Themes: The Virtues of Happiness 27 
Rather we learn to be courageous in relation to a set of activities and then find 
that the skills learned there have implications for other aspects of our lives. 
Moreover, the interrelation of the virtues seem to have a pull that extends our 
lives beyond what we had anticipated. We learn that it is not enough that we be 
courageous, but we must be courageous as a person of self-control is coura-
geous. But neither is self-control sufficient in itself, as the self-controlled person 
must be capable of the anger that derives from our being just. Thus the develop-
ment of one virtue leads to, or at least makes us open to, being formed by other 
virtues. 
This perhaps helps explain how the development of the virtues are crucial to 
our becoming people of character, but it is obviously not sufficient. As we have 
already noted, character is not simply all the virtues added up; nor is it the par-
ticular mixture of the virtues characteristic of one person. Character is not sim-
ply the collection or combination of many virtues, but rather all the various vir-
tues must be formed by character if they are to be genuine--that is, not easily lost 
so that we would not will to be other than who we are. 
Confronted with this kind of problem one might well be tempted to conclude 
that Aristotle's account of the virtues, indeed his very characterization of moral-
ity, is incoherent. Not only is his depiction of the individual virtues arbitrary, he 
is not able to provide us with a satisfying account of how we become persons of 
character. It is enough to make you want to return to an ethic of "What should I 
do in X or Y situation?" 
However, we must remember that as yet we do not have the full story. It may 
be that friendship is the crucial element that is missing from this account. The 
virtues, as I have treated them here, appear as individual achievements. Morally, 
it seems we are isolated beings who must forge out of the complexities of our 
experience a decent and virtuous life. But Aristotle does not assume we are so 
isolated.8 On the contrary, we can only be virtuous to the extent we are capable 
of being a friend; or perhaps even more strongly, it may be that without friend-
ship we are incapable of having the character necessary for the acquiring of vir-
tue. Determining why that is the case must wait until we next look at friendship. 
At the very least, however, we can now appreciate why friendship is such a sig-
nificant issue for Aristotle. 
THE LIFE OF CHRISTIANS AS THE LIFE OF VIRTUE 
But what are we to make theologically of this account of the virtues? Chris-
tians, no less than non-Christians, need the virtues to live well. Christians can be 
no less courageous, no less just, no less temperate, no less wise or prudent than 
anyone else. Therefore an ethic of virtue insofar as it helps us learn what is re-
quired to live well, to live happily, is no less important to us. 
There is certainly truth to this, but it suffers from being too simple. It assumes 
that the "virtues" that help us live well are straightforward and clear; but on the 
basis of Aristotle's account, that can hardly be assumed. What justice meant to 
Aristotle may not be what it means for Christians.9 Thus arises the constant em-
phasis by Christian theologians that the virtues of the pagans are nothing less 
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than sin unless transformed by grace. Indeed, Augustine even suggested that un-
less justice, courage, temperance, and prudence were transformed by love they 
could be no use to the Christian. 
It is not, moreover, just the content of the virtues that seems to present a 
problem for Christians, but also their nature. This has been particularly true of 
Protestants who have been concerned to deny all attempts to establish a moral 
standing before God.10 The virtues inextricably appear as something that is our 
achievement, that assures our righteousness, and thus only lead us further from 
the kind of life appropriate to those who have learned that we can only be good 
insofar as another has made us so. Virtue is a category that may be of use by 
Catholics, but we all know they are works of righteous people in the first place. 
I believe those thinkers that have attempted to use the language of virtue for 
displaying the Christian life have not been wrong. However, I think that often 
the formulas they used for the appropriation of the language of virtue were not 
sufficient to suggest the complexity of the matter. For example, Aquinas, follow-
ing Augustine, says that charity is the form of the virtues. Even more strongly, he 
says the natural virtues must be transformed by the infused theological virtues 
before they can be of service for those who would be followers of Jesus.11 Yet 
what does such language mean? Does charity add new content to the virtues? Or 
how does faith or hope transform courage? The formulas sound right, but they 
do little to help us understand how the virtues can be utilized for displaying the 
Christian life without that life being essentially transformed. 
The moral life for Christians derives not from some general conception of the 
good, nor even from an analysis of those skills or excellences that allegedly allow 
human nature to flourish. Rather, the moral life of Christians is determined by 
their allegiance to a historical person they believe is the decisive form of God's 
kingdom. How then could the language of virtue serve to help us understand 
what it could mean to be a follower of Christ, a disciple of Jesus? After all, Jesus 
did not say if you are to be a follower of me you must develop those virtues that 
will make you a morally impressive person. Rather he said, "Come and follow 
me." Moreover, it seems that such a following may require nothing less than that 
we be willing to die for his sake. The person of virtue may die rather than com-
promise his integrity, but here we are asked to die not for some moral ideal but 
for the sake of another person. 
While I think there is no easy solution to his seeming incompatibility, I want 
to offer a framework that suggests how Aristotle's account of the virtues can be 
appropriated. The kind of appropriation I suggest requires modification of some 
aspects of Aristotle's account, but in an interesting way I think the kind of modi-
fications I have in mind are consistent with some of Aristotle's best intuitions. 
The reason I think Aristotle's account of the virtues is important for a display 
of the Christian life is because his analysis of the virtues entails dealing with the 
temporal character of our life. For as we have seen, the virtues in fact are the 
means through which we are initiated into a journey. Indeed in a sense they are 
the form of the journey. Yet the outlines of that journey, its plot, its main char-
acters, its dramatic tensions remain unclear. It is as if Aristotle worked out an 
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account of the moral life necessary for a strenuous task but no such task ap-
peared that was worth the effort. 
And it is exactly that emptiness at the heart of Aristotle's vision that makes 
him so appropriate as we reflect on the Christian life. As Macintyre has sug-
gested, it was no accident that Aristotle was seen by medieval thinkers to be such 
a fruitful source for attempts to provide a systematic presentation of the Chris-
tian life. u They could supply what Aristotle's account of virtue lacked--namely, a 
narrative in which the development of virtues made sense. For the medieval vi-
sion, schooled as it was on the Bible, was "historical in a way that Aristotle's 
could not be. It situates our aiming at the good not just in specific contexts--Aris-
totle situates that aiming within the polis--but in contexts which themselves have 
a history. To move towards the good is to move in time and that movement may 
itself involve new understandings of what it is to move towards the good."13 
Situating Aristotle's account of the virtues in such a context meant that, just 
as Augustine and Aquinas suggested, the virtues were in fact transformed. Now 
they were put at the service of a community who had the task to live out the kind 
of life they believed had been made possible by Jesus of Nazareth. Charity be-
comes the form of the virtues, not through some mysterious transformation, but 
because the virtues are no longer self-referential. Rather they are skills for a 
people who are trying to be faithful to a journey they believe to be crucial for 
God's dealing with the world. Happiness just is my ability to rejoice in the pres-
ence of another, for it is the other that makes it possible for me to be one thing 
rather than another. 
Therefore, more important than the specific virtues Aristotle recommends is 
how his account of the virtues begs for a narrative display. Indeed, at least part 
of what it means for the virtues to be transformed is the necessity of Christians 
to add new virtues to Aristotle's list. Hope is as important as courage, patience is 
as significant as justice, and faithfulness is as crucial as practical wisdom. These 
virtues do not appear in Aristotle's account because they obviously are intelli-
gible in terms of the narrative that Christians believe they are living out. For 
hope, patience, and faithfulness are decisively eschatological virtues--that is, vir-
tues required by a people who believe that our existence, as individuals and as 
societies, is fundamentally historic. There is no way out of history, there is no 
freedom from history, but rather our freedom is developing the virtues that 
make it possible to live in history in a way that is faithful to a God whom we 
believe has given us the means to live truthfully. And to live truthfully is finally 
the only way possible to live happily. 
The acknowledgement of our historic character, moreover, may be exactly 
what is required to give an account of character that seemed so necessary to 
Aristotle's analysis of the virtues. For it seems the kind of constancy that makes 
our actions virtuous--that is, that makes what we do and do not do form a pat-
tern of consistency--is possible only as we learn to be such from others. But how 
are such people known? I think only as they reflect a more determinative story 
that is embodied and lived out by a whole community. 
Perhaps Aristotle is right finally that character is the result of a "natural gift 
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of vision," but he was wrong to think that such a gift was simply intrinsic to some 
people's being. Rather our character, our ability to be faithful to ourselves and 
others, is a gift because it is not finally something I do. My desire to be happy 
insures the fact that I can only make my way in the company of others. It is from 
my companions, that I learn the way of virtue. Therefore, any account of virtue 
that allows me to claim my life as an achievement rather than a gift is fundamen-
tally false, and thus unable to sustain the truthfulness necessary for me to be 
faithful to myself or others. Again we are led to consider friendship not only as 
part of the life of virtue, but as crucial for our becoming people capable of being 
happy. 
Notes 
1. One of the most striking differences between Aristotle's account of morality and 
modernity is Aristotle's lack of concern with any account of morality. He simply saw no 
reason to draw a hard and fast distinction between "morality" and "religion" or "moral-
ity" and "manners." It is with Kant that we get the peculiar modern notion that " moral-
ity" must be a distinguishable realm in the hope that morality might be grounded in the 
non-contingent. As Nussbaum rightly notes in The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), Aristotle begins and ends with the "appearances." As 
she suggests, "Aristotle asks us to look at our practices, seeing, in the different areas, 
what sorts of judges we do, in fact , trust. This judgment about whom to trust and when 
seems to come, like the appearances, from us. We turn to doctors because we do, i.n fact , 
rely on doctors. This reliance, Aristotle insists, does not need to be justified by producing 
a further judge to certify the judge; it is sufficiently 'justified' by the facts of what we do. 
The expert, and our reasons for choosing him, are not behind our practices; they are 
inside them. And yet such experts do, in fact, help us to unravel puzzles" (p. 248) . 
2. See, for example, Edmund Pincoffs' attack on quandary ethics in his Quandaries and 
Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986). 
3. We are in debt to Alasdair Macintyre for the renewed interest in Aristotle's account 
of the virtues as well as the significance of the virtues for the moral life. See his After 
Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) and Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Note Dame Press, 1988). It would be a mistake 
to assume, however, that there is a new consensus about the importance of the virtues or 
how they are best understood. It is still the case that most philosophers and theologians 
that write about ethics do so in a manner that avoids questions of the virtues and/ or treat 
the virtues as dependent on more "principled" approaches to ethics. For example, most 
of the essays on the virtues in the 1988 edition of The Midwest Studies in Philosophy deal 
with the virtues as secondary to more standard accounts of "ethics." See Ethical Theory: 
Character and Virtue, ed. Peter French, Theodore Uehling, and Howard Wettstein (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). In particular, the essays by Kurt Baier, 
Richard Regan and Michael Slote illustrate this tendency. For a particularly useful 
presentation of the objections to virtue theory as well as a response to those objections, 
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see David Solomon's essay "Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics," in this volume, pp. 
428-441. Part of the problem with the very characterization "an ethics of virtue" is that it 
makes it appear that such an ethic is a mirror alternative to those understandings of 
ethics that have been shaped by modernity. As Maclntyre's work makes clear, however, 
any attempt to recover the significance of the virtues will challenge the very paradigms of 
rationality and correlative political presumptions that have shaped modem accounts of 
the moral life. 
4. Macintyre emphasizes the importance of constancy by noting that it presupposes the 
notion of the unity of a human life and correlatively that the very concept of a "whole 
human life" makes sense. The ethical life, he notes, presupposes that "the commitments 
and responsibilities to the future spring from past episodes in which obligations were 
conceived and debts assumed unite the present to past and future in such a way as to 
make of a human life a unity." He argues that by the time of Jane Austen, who Macintyre 
thinks to be the last great Christian Aristotelian, such unity can no longer be treated as 
the mere presupposition of the moral life. "It has itself to be continually reaffirmed and 
its reaffirmation in deed rather than in word is the virtue which Jane Austen calls a con-
stancy. Constancy is crucial in at least two novels, Mansfield Parle and Persuasion, in each 
of which it is a central virtue of the heroine. And without constancy all the other virtues 
to some degree lose their point. Constancy is reinforced by and reinforces the Christian 
virtue of patience, just as patience which is reinforced by and reinforces the Aristotelian 
virtue of courage, is not the same as courage. For just as patience necessarily involves 
recognition of the character of the world, of a kind which courage does not necessarily 
require, so constancy requires a recognition of a particular kind of threat to the integrity 
of the personality in the peculiarly modem social world, a recognition which patience 
does not necessarily require" f.!tfter Vinue, p. 242). 
5. I certainly do not mean to suggest that Aristotle would welcome the notion of journey 
as integral to his construal of the virtues, but rather that the teleological character of the 
moral life he presupposes can be so displayed. 
6. Nancy Sherman provides the best account available of Aristotle's understanding of 
moral education in The Fabric of Charocter: Aristotle's Theory of Vinue (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1989), pp. 157-199. She rightly emphasizes how crucial friendship is for the 
development of practical wisdom and character. As she notes, ''we can say that the 
:ational pursuit of ends includes, for Aristotle, a common or social conception of the 
This entails a jointly articulated end, as well as collaborative efforts in the promo-
ion of it. In an important way rational agency and its objects are extended. What is 
vithin our power and perceptual gaze extends beyond the first person. Simply to make 
he informed choice and to see what is relevant often requires the resources of others" 
p. 109). 
. Sherman rightly notes that "Aristotle's claim that the virtues are in principle consis-
!nt needs to be distinguished from the claim that the virtuous life is conflict free. The 
1ct that the virtues 'may be' in principle consistent does not preclude the possibility of 
conflicts" (ibid., p.105). 
I have not tried to deal in this essay with the complex issues surrounding the individu-
_ization of the virtues. Aristotle's resort to the mean, as we noted, is clearly unsatisfac-
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tory. The virtues can only be individualized against a community's practices and the 
narratives that give those practices intelligibility. Aristotle simply assumed that we exist in 
such narratives not having had the disadvantage of being formed by the modern presup-
position that we are individual selves prior to being part of a tradition. 
9. I suspect an Aristotelian account may well be closer to the way Christians ought to 
think about justice than accounts such as John Rawls's (see his A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)). For Aristotle no account of justice is 
possible that does not require that we have the virtue of justice. Rawls, on the other 
hand, writes to make justice possible for a social system of the presupposition that people 
need only be self-interested. For example, Macintyre notes that Hobbes translates 
Aristotle's pleonexia as "a desire of more than their share." Yet Aristotle understood 
pleonexia to be no more or Jess than acquisitiveness. Nor can this be translated as greed 
as Irwin does. Macintyre argues that "what such translations of 'pleonexia' conceal from 
us is the extent of the difference between Aristotle's standpoint on the virtues and vices, 
and more especially his standpoint on justice and the dominant standpoint of peculiarly 
modem societies. For the adherents of that standpoint recognize that acquisitiveness is a 
character trait indispensable to continuous and limitless economic growth, and one of 
their central beliefs is that continuous and limitless economic growth is a fundamental 
good. That a systematically lower standard of living ought to be preferred to a systemati-
cally higher standard of living is a thought incompatible with either the economics or the 
politics of peculiarly modem societies. So prices and wages have come to be understood 
as unrelated-and indeed in a modern economy could not be related-to desert in terms of 
labor, and the notion of a just price or a just wage in modern terms makes no sense. But 
a community which was guided by Aristotelian norms would not only have to view 
acquisitiveness as a vice but would have to set strict limits to growth insofar as that is 
necessary to preserve or enhance a distribution of goods according to desert" (Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? p. 112). ' 
10. Gilbert Meilaender, a Lutheran, has developed a constructive account of the virtues. 
In particular see his The Theory and Practice of Vinue (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1984). Meilaender notes "before Christian ethicists latch too quickly onto an 
ethic of virtue, it is important to remember that an emphasis on character may sit 
uneasiJy with some strands of Christian beliefs. No theologian has urged this point more 
forcefully than Luther. The virtues are, many have wanted to say, 'good for us.' A sketch 
of the virtues is a picture of a fulfilled life, of the successful realization of a self. Such an 
approach cannot without difficulty be incorporated into a vision of the world which has at 
its center a crucified God-which takes, that is, not self-realization but self-sacrifice as its 
central theme. Furthermore, the very notion of character seems to suggest-has suggested 
at least since behavior, abilities within our power, an acquired 
possession. And this in turn may be difficult to reconcile with the Christian emphasis on 
grace, the sense of the sinner's constant need of forgiveness, and the belief that we can 
have no claims upon the freedom of God" (p. x) . As a committed Methodist, I cannot 
agree with Meilaender's way of putting the issue, since I do not think the "need for 
forgiveness" is a sufficient account of the salvation found in the ministry of Jesus of 
Nazareth. Jesus did not come just to forgive us our sins but to offer us new life in an 
ongoing kingdom. 
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11. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theo/ogica, 1, 2, Q. 65, article 2; Q . 63, article 3. For a 
further discussion of these is.sues, see my "On Developing Hopeful Virtues," Christian 
Scholars Review, 18 (December, 1988): 107-117. 
12. Macintyre, After Virtue, pp. 175-177. 
13. Ibid., p. 176. 

Part III: Companions on the Way: 
The Necessity of Friendship 
IN THE BEGINNING WAS FRIENDSHIP 
I began by suggesting that happiness, the life of virtue, and friendship were 
inextricably interrelated. We cannot understand the kind of happiness that we 
should desire without understanding the life of virtue, but the life of virtue, as we 
shall see, finally requires an account of friendship. Further, friendship turns out 
to be essential for illuminating any happiness worth having. Indeed I have argued 
this interrelation is but an indication of why any adequate account of the moral 
life inherently entails a sense of the temporal character of our existence. To un-
derstand and, more importantly, to live a life of virtue and happiness requires 
our willingness to undertake a journey that is as interesting as it is demanding. 
That it is such means friendship is required not only to understand the nature of 
the journey but to sustain us on the way. 
I could as well have begun these articles by undertaking an analysis of friend-
ship rather than happiness. In many ways that might have been preferable. Hap-
piness suggests that the moral life is finally a matter of individual achievement 
and effort. Even the attempt lo construe our desire for happiness in terms of a 
journey tends to underwrite this assumption, since we tend to associate accounts 
of journeys with heroic endeavors of an individual. 
Thus Aristotle says at the beginning of Book VII, 
Continuing in a sequence, the next subject which we shall have to 
discuss is friendship. For it is some sort of excellence or virtue, or 
involves virtue, and it is, moreover, most indispensable for life. No one 
would choose lo live without friends, even if he had all other goods. 
Rich men and those who hold office and power are, above all others, 
regarded as requiring friends. For what good would their prosperity do 
them if it did not provide them with the opportunity for good works? 
And the best works done and those which deserve the highest praise are 
those that are done to one's friends {1155al-10). 
As we shall see, this assertion but scratches the surface of Aristotle's account 
of friendship. Just as Aristotle led us to see that the life of virtue is not simply a 
"means" to happiness, neither are friends incidental to the happy life. Rather 
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friendship is intrinsic to our ability to live well, an activity crucial to the very 
meaning and nature of happiness. Thus in a summary passage Aristotle says, 
We stated at the beginning that happiness is some kind of activity, and 
activity clearly is something that comes into being and not something we 
can take for granted like a piece of property. From the propositions: (1) 
being happy consists in liking and in being active, and as we stated at the 
beginning, the activity of a good man is in itself good and pleasant; (2) 
what is our own is a pleasant thing to us; (3) we are better able to 
observe our neighbors than ourselves,and their actions better than our 
own; and ( 4) the actions of persons who have a high moral standard are 
pleasant to those good men who are their friends, in that they possess 
both qualities which are pleasant by nature (i.e., they are good and they 
are their own); it follows that a supremely happy man wilJ need friends 
of this kind. His moral purpose or choice is to observe actions which are 
good and which are his own, and such are the actions of a good man 
who is his friend (1169b28-1170a3). 
It is no wonder, therefore, that Aristotle spent two books of the Ethics on the 
subject of friendship. That he did so is in marked contrast with contemporary 
ethics where the question of friendship and its character is as overlooked as the 
analysis of the virtues.1 We may think that happiness has some relation to ques-
tions of morality, but we seldom think an account of happiness requires such an 
extensive analysis of friendship. For Aristotle the exact opposite is the case. As 
we have seen, he believed a certain kind of self-knowledge, a practical wisdom, is 
necessary for the happy life. Without friendship, however, such knowledge is im-
possible. As John Cooper has pointed out, the person of character can come to 
know his own character only by studying that of his friend. 
The presumption is that even an intimate friend remains distinct enough 
to be studied objectively; yet because one intuitively knows oneself to be 
fundamentally the same character as he is, one obtains through him an 
objective view of oneself. One recogriizes the quality of one's own 
character and one's own life by seeing it reflected, as in a mirror, in 
one's friend.2 
But to see why this is the case we must look more closely at Aristotle's analysis 
of " true friendship." 
ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP 
Aristotle begins his account by distinguishing between three different kinds of 
friendship which correspond to three types of affection--useful, pleasant and per-
fect friendship. 
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In each of these the affection can be reciprocated so that the partner is 
aware of it, and the partners wish for each other's good in terms of the 
motive on which their affection is based. Now when the motive of the 
affection is usefulness, the partners do not feel affection for one another 
per-se but in terms of the good accruing to each from the other. The 
same is also true of those whose friendship is based on pleasure: we 
love witty people, not for what they are, but for the pleasure they give 
us. (Thus in these kinds of friendships) the friend is loved not because 
he is a friend, but because he is useful or pleasant. Thus, these two 
kinds are friendship only incidentally, since the object of affection is not 
loved for being the kind of person he is, but for providing some good or 
pleasure. Consequently, such friendships are easily dissolved when the 
partners do not remain unchanged: the affection ceases as soon as one 
partner is no longer pleasant or useful to the other (1156a9-20). 
In contrast, perfect or true friendship is that "between good men who are like 
in excellence or virtue. For these friends wish alike for one another's good be-
cause they are good men, and they are good per-se (that is, their goodness is 
something intrinsic, not incidental)" (1156b5-10). Only this kind of friendship 
can be called such properly since the friendship is not based on incidental con-
siderations and therefore is lasting. Just as the acts that appear virtuous are such 
only as they contribute to the life of one who has a firm and unchangeable char-
acter, so friendship is possible only to those whose life is not subject to change 
by good or bad fortune. Only such people are capable of friendship without 
qualification, "for in this kind of friendship the partners are like one another, 
and the other objects worthy of affection--the unqualified good and the unquali-
fied pleasant--are also found in it, and these are the highest objects of affection" 
(1156b23-25). 
It is important to note that Aristotle does not suggest that there are three 
kinds of friendship, for in the "primary and proper sense of the word, we call 
'friendship' that which exists between good men as good men" (1156b31). 
Friendships of pleasure and use are called such only by analogy. For while they 
"bear some resemblance" to true friendship, they lack the essential characteris-
tics necessary to genuine friendship. Thus it is impossible for bad people to be 
friends on the basis of pleasure and usefulness, but only good men can be friends 
based on what they are since only they are capable of finding joy in one another 
(1157a16-20). 
Recently some have suggested that Aristotle has overstated his case insofar as 
well-wishing is a characteristic common to all forms of friendship. Unless friend-
;hip is construed in this larger sense it would seem that ordinary people, with the 
1ormal mixture of some good and some bad qualities of character, are not eli-
9ble to be friends.3 Even more disturbing if rigorously pressed, Aristotle's ac-
:ount of true friendship makes one wonder if true friendship has or can ever ex-
st. 
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While interesting in itself, the question of how to resolve how friendship of 
use and pleasure may be related to true friendship is not of immediate interest in 
terms of the issues before us. However, the issue of whether true friendship is a 
real possibility cannot be avoided. For unless true friendship is a possibility, 
Aristotle's whole account of the moral life risks becoming an idealistic abstrac-
tion. Moreover, I think by pressing the issue we will be able to see why Aris-
totle's account of the life of virtue entails a sense of journey. 
Aristotle certainly never seems to imply that true friendship is an impossibil-
ity, though he does not think it common. That such is the case is not simply due 
to our limitations as virtuous agents, but also because of the very character of 
friendship. "To be friends with many people, in the sense of perfect friendship, is 
impossible, just as it is impossible to be in love with many at the same time. For 
love is like an extreme, and an extreme tends to be unique. It does not easily 
happen that one man finds many people very pleasing at the same time, nor per-
haps does it easily happen that there are many people who are good. Also, one 
must have some experience of the other person and have come to be familiar 
with him, and that is the hardest thing of all. But it is possible to please many 
people on the basis of usefulness and pleasantness, since many have these quali-
ties, and the services they have to offer do not take a long time" (1158a10-18). 
Thus, if friendship is based on virtue and the character of our friends, it is im-
possible to be a friend of many people. Rather "we must be content if we find 
even a few friends of this kind" (1171a17-20). 
What then are we to make of Aristotle's claim that "friendship seems to hold 
states together" so that lawgivers even devote more attention to it than justice 
(1155a22). Indeed he goes further and observes that different forms of constitu-
tions enhance different forms of friendships so that perverted forms of constitu-
tions decrease or pervert true friendship (1160a30-1161b10). It would seem that 
the kind of friendship that holds states together can only be that of use or pleas-
ure. 
Yet it may be that such a suggestion is to take Aristotle's distinction between 
the three kinds of friendship too seriously; or perhaps put more accurately, Aris-
totle's account of true friendship is more complex than his initial distinction be-
tween the three kinds of friendship suggests. For, as he says, 
it seems that friendship and the just deal with the same objects and 
involve the same persons. For there seems to be a notion of what is just 
in every community, and friendship seems to be involved as well. Men 
address as friends their fellow travelers on a voyage, their fellow 
soldiers, and similarly also those who are associated with them in other 
kinds of community. Friendship is present to the extent that men share 
something in common, for that is also the extent to which they share a 
view of what is just. And the proverb "friends hold in common what 
they have" is correct, for friendship consists in community (1159b25-30). 
Yet it would be unjust to Aristotle's account to fasten on the contention that 
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friendship is present insofar as people share something in common, in the inter-
est of defending him from a far too narrow treatment of friendship. It makes all 
the difference what it is they share in common. In this respect the issue of the 
possibility of true friendship is not unlike the question of the kind of constancy 
necessary for our becoming virtuous. Behind Aristotle's concern to limit true 
friendship to a few relations is to find a basis for friendship that can insure its 
stability. 
That is why friendship requires equality between the friends. Such equality is 
not the same kind as that pertaining to matters of justice, that is, proportionate 
or quantitative equality, but rather is that established by virtue. 
Friendship is equality and likeness, and especially the likeness of those 
who are similar in virtue. Because they are steadfast in themselves, they 
are also steadfast toward one another; they neither request nor render 
any service that is base. On the contrary, one might even say that they 
prevent base services; for what characterizes good men is that they 
neither go wrong themselves nor let their friends do so. Bad people, on 
the other hand, do not have the element of constancy, for they do not 
remain similar even to themselves (1159b4-12). 
Thus, contrary to popular impressions, Aristotle does not assume that people 
must be strictly equal in status, power or position to be friends. Certainly he as-
sumes that friendship between slave and free, man and woman, citizen and ruler 
are difficult, but they are not impossible since equality is that secured on the ba-
sis of virtue.4 In a sense, therefore, friendship is not determined by the political, 
but friendship determines the political insofar as it is the purpose of good poli-
tics to make the life of virtue possible. Thus Aristotle observes sadly that in most 
states "each man lives as he pleases, dealing out law to his children and his wife 
as the Cyclopes do. Now the best thing would be to make the correct care of 
these matters a common concern. But if the community neglects them, it would 
seem to be incumbent upon every man to help his children and friends attain 
virtue. This he will be capable of doing, or at least intend to do" (1180a25-31). 
Thus friendship becomes for Aristotle his account of a true polity in the absence 
of any society ordered by a just constitution.5 
For Aristotle, our task is not to become virtuous, thus establishing the kind of 
equality necessary for friendship and then to seek out friends. Rather, friendship 
itself is an activity necessary for us to acquire the kind of steadfastness necessary 
for our being true friends. True friendship is, therefore, not some ideal that ac-
tual friendships never achieve, but rather true friendship is a process that makes 
possible our becoming virtuous in a manner that transforms ourselves and our 
friendship. I suspect that is why Aristotle is so tolerant of the lesser forms of 
friendship. They at least have the potential of putting us on the road to virtue. 
Equality is not a means lo friendship, but rather friendship makes possible a 
kind of equality between good people. It is through friendship that we are fur-
ther initiated into activity befitting virtue as we learn to be faithful to self 
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through being faithful to another. Social and personal inequalities can be made 
part of the "incidental" aspects of our existence through friendship as good men 
are made through participation in a common activity which is worthwhile in and 
of itself. That is why ''when friendship is based on character, it does last, because 
it is friendship for its own sake, (in which each partner loves his friend for what 
he is)" (1164all-13). 
By calling friendship an activity, Aristotle means something as concrete as his 
account of the various virtues. Just as a virtue is not some means to an end, but 
is a skill necessary for people of character, so friendship is a skill that requires 
concrete expression if we are to benefit from it. Thus, while it is not impossible 
for friendships to exist when friends are absent from one another, if the absence 
lasts for a long time it can be the end of friendship. "For nothing characterizes 
friends as much as living in each other's company. Material advantage is desired 
by those who stand in need, but company is something which is wanted even by 
men who are supremely happy, for they are the least suited to live in isolation" 
(1157b19-20). 
In order to understand Aristotle's account of friendship it is crucial to see that 
he is insisting that friendship is not just based on virtue, it is a virtue. Certainly 
friends must share something in common, but the problem with many kinds of 
friendship is that what is held in common is not lasting, so that when the project 
or trip is over so is the friendship. In contrast, Aristotle is insisting that what 
friends have in common is a certain kind of friendship that is only possible be-
cause of the kind of character they have. Friendship is both a characteristic and 
activity by which the agents become good through the activity itself (1168a5-7). 
Thus in loving a friend we also learn to love our own good. 
For when a good man becomes a friend he becomes a good to the 
person whose friend he is. Thus, each partner both loves his own good 
and makes an equal return in the good he wishes for his partner and in 
the pleasure he gives him. Now friendship is said to be equality, and 
both those qualities inhere in the relationship between good men 
(1157b34-40). 
Even though friendship is a relation, Aristotle does not assume that it is only 
possible in the presence of another. Indeed for us to be people capable of enjoy-
ing true friendship, we must be friends with ourselves. For as Aristotle suggests, 
we count as a friend: 
(1) a person who wishes for and does what is good or what appears to 
him to be good for his friend's sake; or (2) a person who wishes for the 
existence and life of his friend for the friend's sake. We regard as a 
friend also (3) a person who spends his time in our company and (4) 
whose desires are the same as ours, or (5) a person who shares sorrow 
and joy with his friend. A good man has all these feelings in relation to 
himself, (1166al-10) 
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and thus, it makes perfect sense to suggest that we can be a friend to ourselves. 
Indeed the matter must be put more strongly, for we not only can be a friend 
to ourselves, if we are people of character we must be our "own best friend and 
should have the greatest affection for himself' (1168b9). If we are not capable of 
being our own best friend we will lack exactly the constancy necessary to be men 
of character and thus cannot rightly be friends with others. That is why a wicked 
man cannot be a friend even of themselves because they have committed many 
crimes and run away from their lives. They seek the company of others with 
whom they can spend their days, but they avoid their own company as they are 
incapable of remembering their past and they fear their future (1166b10-25). In 
effect, they lack the means to see and have continuity between what they are and 
what they do. Friendship with ourselves makes constancy possible. 
Therefore there can be no tension between our love for others and ourselves.6 
If we love ourselves rightly, that is as people of virtue, then we will rightly love 
others. As good people we should love ourselves, for such love is not the de-
based form of egoism that does everything for its own sake. The good person, 
therefore, will "wish to spend time with himself, for he does so with pleasure. 
The memory of his achievements gives him delight, and his hopes for the future 
are good" (1166a24). By being a friend with another, we are in fact friends with 
ourselves, since our "friend really is another self' (1.166a31). 
There is no doubt much wisdom in Aristotle's account of the necessity that we 
be friends with ourselves. Yet there are two problems that are not easily re-
solved. If loving another is but a form of self-love, then can we be said to be 
genuinely loving another as another? Aristotle is rightly concerned to provide an 
account of the moral prerequisites for friendship that make friendship endure 
across time and in the face of fortune. In many ways it is the same kind of prob-
lem of the kind of stability of self necessary to be a person of character. To sup-
ply such stability be wants to anchor friendship in a similar love of similar vir-
tue--friendship, like virtue, becomes an activity that needs no reason to be. But 
as a result we miss any sense of what we think crucial to friendship--namely, 
learning to value another not because they are like us but because they are dif-
ferent from us. 
This obviously has much to do with the issue I raised at the beginning con-
cerning the necessity of friendship for self-knowledge that is crucial for our being 
virtuous. I think the above analysis has supported that contention, but there is 
still a question whether Aristotle has gone far enough. For if we need friends to 
know ourselves, how can we know what we are if there are no interesting differ-
ences between us and our friends? I suspect this problem relates to Aristotle's 
continuing Platonic assumption that there is a unity to the virtues, thus people of 
character will, insofar as they are moral, be the same. But if the virtues are ca-
pable of quite different arrangements within any one life, or if they may even 
conflict, then it seems that our friend may be quite different than we are. More-
over, such difference is not a sign of moral failure, but necessary if we are to 
know what we are.7 
The second problem is but a form of the problem of difference between 
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fr iends. Aristotle rightly sees that it is crucial that friends should be able to rely 
on one another--1 can trust you to be what you are. But he requires such a strong 
account of self-sufficiency in order to sustain trust that he comes close to deny-
ing the kind of vulnerability and mutuality we think necessary for friendship.8 
For example, Aristotle says people of virtue need friends because the "function 
of a friend is to do good rather than to be treated well, if the performance of 
good deeds is the mark of a good man and of excellence, and if it is nobler to do 
good to a friend than to a stranger, then a man of high moral standards will need 
people to whom he can do good" (1169b10-13). Or again he says that "friendship 
appears to consist in giving rather than in receiving affection" (1159a26). 
His insistence on this point extends well beyond the doing of good deeds for 
our friend, however, as he suggests that a noble man prefers friends present dur-
ing good, rather than bad, fortune. He does so because it is painful to see our 
friends "pained by our misfortunes, for everyone tries to avoid being the cause of 
a friend's pain. For that reason, manly natures take scrupulous care not to let 
their friends share their pain" (ll7lb5-6). Whereas in good fortune, 
the presence of friends brings with it a pleasant way of passing one's 
time and the pleasant thought that they are pleased by the good we are 
enjoying. This is the reason for thinking that we ought to be eager to 
invite our friends to share our good fortunes, since it is noble to do 
good, and to be reluctant to ask our friend to share our misfortune, 
since one should let others participate as little as possible in what is evil. 
We should invite our friends to come to our side chiefly when a little 
trouble on their part will mean great benefit to us (ll7lbl4-20). 
We, thus, seem to have returned to Aristotle's "high-minded man" who wel-
comes great risks because he desires to do good, but is ashamed to accept a 
good turn. He is so because by doing good he is able to put the other in his debt 
while providing himself with an added benefit (1124b7-18). There is much to be 
said for Aristotle's realism as he is no doubt correct that many of our friendships 
have such a character. But there seems to be something deeply wrong with such 
realism as it runs counter to Aristotle's central contention about the nature of 
friendship. For if the person of character can only be a friend by being "strong," 
he or she seems to lack the means to share in the common activity Aristotle says 
is essential to friendship. 
John Cooper argues, however, that Aristotle's account of friendship inher-
ently presupposes human vulnerability. Cooper characterizes Aristotle's conten-
tion " that to know the goodness of one's life, which he reasonably assumes to be 
a necessary condition of flourishing, one needs to have intimate fr iends whose 
lives are similarly good, since one is better able to reach a sound and secure esti-
mate of the quality of life when it is not one's own."9 Thus friendship is required 
because each of us left to our own devices cannot reach a secure estimate of our 
own moral character, 
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nor by ourselves can we find our lives continuously interesting and 
enjoyable, because the sense of the value of the activities that make 
them up is not within the individual's power to bestow. The sense of 
one's own worth is, for human beings, a group accomplishment. Hence 
we need each other because as individuals we are not sufficient--
psychologically sufficient--to sustain our own lives.10 
While I think Cooper is certainly right, he fails to address the main issue. The 
question is not whether we need friends because we are vulnerable, but whether 
we should not be the kind of people who will the presence of other people in a 
manner that makes us vulnerable to their presence. Aristotle wants to protect us 
and our friendship against the threat of fortune, time and change. He thus 
searches for the means to insure the stability of friendship by insuring that 
friends are in a sense "self-contained," but in the process friends lose exactly 
that which is necessary for friendship--the ability to accept not just gifts from our 
friend but friendship itself as a gift. 
FRIENDSHIP IN THEOWGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In order to bring all this to a close, as well as to suggest what theological im-
plications all this may have, I want to call your attention to another book on 
friendship--namely the Gospel of John. I think it is no accident that one of the 
climactic passages of John consists of Jesus admonishing the disciples in this 
manner, 
If you abide in me, and my words abide in you, ask whatever you will, 
and it shall be done for you. By this my Father is glorified, that you bear 
much fruit, and so prove to be my disciples. As the Father has loved me, 
so have I loved you; abide in my love. If you keep my commandments, 
you will abide in my love, just as I have kept my Father's 
commandments and abide in his love. These things I have spoken to 
you, that my joy may be in you, and that your joy may be full. This is my 
commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you. Greater 
love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. 
You are my friends if you do what I command you. No longer do I call 
you servants, for the servant does not know what his master is doing; 
but I have called you friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I 
have made known to you. You did not choose me, but I chose you and 
appointed you that you should go and bear fruit and that your fruit 
should abide; so that whatever you ask the Father in my name, he may 
give it to you. This I command you, to love one another" (John 15:7-17). 
It is interesting that Jesus does not ask the disciples to be friends, but he com-
iands them to be friends. By doing so He does not deny the affective nature of 
>Ve, but indicates the kind of friendship He has in mind is of a different order 
ian the normal run of things. It is a friendship made possible because through 
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His life a new order has come into being. An order that makes friendship pos-
sible not because we are alike, but because we are different. To learn to follow 
Jesus is the way we become friends of God. But what an extraordinary idea--for 
on what basis could it ever be possible for us to be God's friend? 
It would seem that such friendship is possible only because God refuses to let 
our limitations determine His life. Thus we are told, 
For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever 
believes in him should not perish but have eternal life. For God sent the 
Son into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world might 
be saved through him. He who believes in him is not condemned; he 
who does not believe is condemned already, because he has not believed 
in the name of the only Son of God (John 3:16-18). 
That is why Jesus speaks of giving us a new commandment even though on 
the surface it seems anything but new. We have known all along that we should 
love one another. Something like love, after all, is commended by many cultures 
and moral codes. But the love that is generally recommended is vastly different 
than the love that Jesus commands. The love he commands is "as I have loved 
you," that we can thus "love one another." For by this "all men will know that 
you are my disciples, if you have love for one another" (John 13:34-35). 
But how has Jesus loved us? He has loved us quite simply by making us His 
friends. He has done this because, unlike servants who do not know what the 
master is doing, He has made known to us all that the Father has willed. In ef-
fect, He has made us capable of friendship because He has made us agents in an 
ongoing history. He has made us agents because He bas patiently forced us to 
learn to see the truth by transforming us to see a God who would love unre-
lentingly, even to having His son die that His kingdom might be a reality. Such 
love does not remove the difference between us and God, but rather makes our 
difference contribute to rather than prevent our friendship. 
As we have seen, this is no easy lesson for us to learn. We prefer to be friends 
with a God who bears a closer resemblance to Aristotle's "high-minded man"--
that is, a God who is always ready to help, to comfort, to love, but is never there 
to be helped, to be loved, or need our friendship. We want a God sufficient to 
Himself so that He needs no other friends than Himself. But that is not the kind 
of God we find through Jesus' life and death. Rather we find a God who gra-
ciously has provided us a place within His own life--a place that He refuses to 
revoke. 
Thus Jesus unashamedly requires that we not only learn to love one another, 
but we should learn to love Him and love Him rightly (John 14:28). Leaming to 
love God is the condition for our learning to love one another, for our learning 
to be friends. To be sure, our fr iendship with Jesus is not determined on our 
terms as we did not choose Him but rather He chose us. Nonetheless, we are 
thus given the privilege of loving God by continuing in the life initiated by Jesus. 
Friendship is no less central to the moral life for John than for Aristotle. But 
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it is a friendship that is constant because He who has made us His friends is true 
in a way we can never be. Our constancy is not the result of our will, but rather 
because we and others find ourselves through participation in a common activity 
that makes us faithful both to ourselves and the other. That activity is not, as it 
almost seems to be in Aristotle, mutual enjoyment as an end in itself, but rather 
it is the activity of a task which we have been given. That task is nothing less 
than to participate in a new way of life made possible by the life of this man, 
Jesus of Nazareth. 
The constancy necessary for friendship is transformed in the light of this task. 
It is not necessary to make the self impervious to the threats that accompany our 
love of another. Because our character is the result of a transformation that has 
been made possible by a gift, we are able to risk being present to others without 
feeling the need of protection. The constancy that Aristotle quite rightly sees as 
necessary for friendship turns out to be possible only if we are able through our 
lives to point to a source outside our lives that makes it possible. Or, put more 
directly, the constancy of our character is not finally "ours," but is the result of a 
relation that would be impossible without the willingness of God to always be 
there. 
That is why, as Christians, we can risk the kind of partiality required by 
friendship. Friendship is not just an instance of some more universal love, it is 
the attention and regard for another precisely as they are other, as they are dif-
ferent, from ourselves. We can take the risk of such love because we are called 
to imitate the partiality of God's love for us as shown through His son. As Helen 
Oppenheimer has contended, 
" Impartiality'' is not a divine virtue, but a human expedient to make up 
for the limits of our concern on the one hand and the corruptibility of 
our affections on the other. If we find ourselves neglecting, or spoiling, 
or abusing, we need to be more even-handed and partiality becomes a 
vice; but the august partiality of God is a taking hold of the special 
character of each creature as uniquely significant.11 
In short, God is able to love each creature as a friend without His love being 
diminished for any other creature. It is through our friendships formed by Christ 
that the Christian learns to participate in that love. 
Friendship is not only a possibility but a necessity for Christians because we 
are an eschatological people that live by hope. That life is a journey is something 
that Aristotle sensed in his account of the life of happiness, virtue and friendship. 
But for Christians, life is not just a journey, but a journey of a very particular 
kind in which we are invited to be participants in a community of friends formed 
)y the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth. Such friends do not just love one an-
)ther as mirror images of their own virtue, but rather they love one another in 
::Jod. Friendship is a manifestation of hope, therefore, as hope but names the 
ind of journey to which Christians have been called that makes possible the 
isks of friendship. 
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As Aristotle saw clearly, friendship is a fragile business. We often enter into 
relations with one another before we can have the knowledge that the other is 
capable of being the kind of person suited to being a friend. This means, as 
Gilbert Meilaender says, "We may commit ourselves to persons for whom our 
regard may fade. Yet, in thus committing ourselves to another person, we create 
in that friend a set of expectations, needs and loyalties which cannot simply be 
set aside without pain and grief."U That is why Aristotle says even if we find that 
a friend we thought was good is not, we should not break off the friendship 
quickly if we think there is a chance to reform him (1165b12-20). 
But for Christians, friendship, even with the enemy, must at least be offered 
as we have the basis to hope that such an off er can be used by God to create a 
new friend. We know that we may be disappointed in our friends, or even worse, 
we may disappoint a friend; but we also know that we are participants in a jour-
ney that can sustain us through our disappointments and hurts. We have been 
commanded to be friends with one another, that even though we are strangers to 
one another, friendship is possible. That is the way we bear fruit, for in that way 
the world can see how a people love one another and, even more, how happy 
that makes us.13 
Notes 
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and Ethics in Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
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The Fabric of Charocter: Aristotle's Theory of (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 
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supply the community that is missing. In effect, the only political alternative we have is 
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political presuppositions, that form of friendship is not recognized as political but rather 
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today is to discover how we can be a community that provides for the flourishing of 
friendship in a manner that can challenge the "politics" of our time. 
6. The central problem of modem moral theory-that is, how to resolve the tension 
between egoism and altruism-is simply unknown to Aristotle. What we can now see is 
the very problem of egoism and altruism is not an eternal dilemma caused by something 
called the human condition, but rather is the result of changed social presumptions and 
practices that Aristotle could only see as corrupt. I am, moreover, sure Aristotle would be 
right to so understand the matter. 
7. I suspect part of Aristotle's difficulty in this respect is related to the absence of any 
account of moral development. For moral development has to deal with the particulari-
ties of our histories as integral to our moral formation. The conceptual resources to give 
an account of our biographical situatedness was simply not available to Aristotle. To the 
extent one can extract from Aristotle an adequate account of moral development, 
Sherman has certainly done so in her The Fabric of Charocter: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 157-199. Of course, as Macintyre makes clear in 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 
1988), this issue becomes even more complex as soon as the Christian notion of sin is 
introduced (pp. 146-159). 
8. However, as Amelie Rorty argues, "It has been thought that there is some problem in 
Aristotle's making friendship necessary to the well-lived life on the one hand, while at the 
same time emphasizing the priority of self-sufficient, self-contained energeiai on the other 
(1169b3-13). Self-sufficiency has of course nothing to do with isolation or even with self-
development. A self-sufficient life is one whose activities are intrinsically worthy, have 
their ends in themselves, are worth choosing regardless of what may come of them. 
Aristotle is not concerned to justify friendship because it conduces to or promotes self-
development but because it is part of a self- contained, fully realized life (1097bl-20). See 
"The Place of Contemplation" in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, p. 389. See also 
Sherman's discussion (The Fabric of Character) on pp. 130-131. 
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Is Athens Revived 
Jerusalem Denied? 
PHILIP L. QUINN 
ln his engaging reflections on the Aristotelian themes of happiness, virtue and 
friendship, Stanley Hauerwas extends and elaborates the pattern of his own ethi-
cal thought. He treats each of the three themes by first expounding Aristotle and 
then adding a theological postscript in which he suggests ways in which Aris-
totle's ethical thought might be appropriated by Christian ethics. The picture 
that emerges from this treatment is extremely generous to the pagan wisdom of 
Aristotle. Hauerwas gives the impression that Aristotle came close to being on 
target with respect to the ethical significance of happiness, virtue and friendship 
and so can be incorporated into Christian ethical thought with only minor modi-
fications and a few additions. 
I find this picture problematic. It seems to me to locate the center of gravity 
of Christian ethics too close to Athens and too far from Jerusalem. It also under-
estimates the extent to which Christian wisdom about the moral life can and 
should be seen as radically opposed to pagan wisdom. On many points of detail I 
have no quarrel with Hauerwas and find the crispness of his formulations and 
the shrewdness of his insights helpful. But I suspect that he and I would disagree 
sharply about fundamentals, for I am inclined to emphasize a different set of 
themes in trying to get at what is basic in Christian ethical thought. It is not that 
I have the temerity to suppose that Hauerwas is clearly mistaken in wanting to 
appropriate Aristotle. After all, Aquinas made a heroic effort to do just this, and 
he has had many followers among Christian theologians. It is rather that I am 
persuaded that other ways of understanding what is distinctive about Christian 
are apt to yield deeper insights. 
In these brief comments I can do no more than to sketch an alternative vision 
)f what the fundamental themes of Christian ethical thought are and to indicate 
iow they bear on the prospects for successfully appropriating Aristotle in the 
nanner proposed by Hauerwas. To fix ideas about what is at stake in the con-
lict, I begin with some reflections on how the history of Western ethical thought 
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should be narrated. I then discuss critically what Hauerwas has to say about hap-
piness, virtue and friendship. 
THE HISTORICAL ST AKES 
Nietzsche has taught us that we construct genealogies for two purposes: to 
help us understand our origins and to lend legitimacy to what we propose to do 
next. Histories of ethics are genealogical narratives for ethical theorists. So we 
should expect there to be a particular reading of the history of ethics in the back-
ground of the project of incorporating Aristotle into Christian ethics. 
Alasdair Macintyre, who is cited often and approvingly by Hauerwas, pro-
vides a narrative that lends legitimacy to the enterprise of appropriating Aris-
totle for Christian ethics.1 This story hinges on the attempt by Thomas Aquinas 
to incorporate an Aristotelian view of ethics into an Augustinian understanding 
of Christianity. The Thomistic synthesis of Aristotle and Augustine has for vari-
ous reasons not fared well at the hands of liberal modernity, but the tradition it 
represents contains untapped resources for dealing with the ethical problems 
Christians confront today. The task now facing Christian ethics is, therefore, to 
recover and exploit the riches of that tradition. Reflection on its roots in Aris-
totle is the natural starting point for such a project, and so theological reflections 
on Aristotelian themes are an important contribution to advancing the discus-
sion among Christian ethical theorists. 
That, in outline, is one story, but of course there are others that can be told. 
The one I prefer is meant to yield a genealogy that lends legitimacy to the enter-
prise of reviving the divine command tradition of Christian ethics. Its roots are in 
the scriptural narratives of a God who is lavish in commanding His chosen 
people. In this narrative, the Thomistic project will be portrayed as an audacious 
but unsuccessful attempt to graft the alien stock of Aristotelian paganism onto 
Augustinian Christianity. The failure of the Thomistic synthesis in ethics be-
comes apparent long before the heyday of liberal modernity, with its secularizing 
tendencies. It is foreshadowed by the flourishing of a fairly radical form of divine 
command ethics in the thought of the later medievals; scholastic sources of this 
progressive development are to be found in Scotus, Ockham, Pierre d'Ailly, Jean 
Gerson and Gabriel Biel, among others.2 The decisive event in this story is the 
Reformation. It liberates Augustinian Christianity by pruning away the alien 
stock that had been grafted onto it. 
An ethics of divine commands is, at bottom, not an ethics of virtue but an eth-
ics of duty. Divine commands impose obligations, and we who are commanded 
are bound to obey. So the great philosopher with whom divine command theo-
rists can feel at home is not Aristotle but Kant. In a way, this is not at all surpris-
ing, since Kant's own moral sensibilities were shaped by the Lutheran Christian-
ity of his culture. He tells us that "an ethical commonwealth can be thought of 
only as a people under divine commands, i.e., as a people of God, and indeed 
under laws of virtue."3 Sin, he says, is "the transgressing of the moral law as a 
divine command.'>4 Hence the task for Christian ethics today suggested by the 
story I have sketched is the assimilation of Kantian insights into the ongoing tra-
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dition of divine command ethics. Aristotle, by contrast, is to be viewed from a 
considerable critical distance, though he will, to be sure, occasionally have some-
thing worthwhile to say. It is this kind of critical and skeptical eye that I propose 
to cast on Hauerwas's reflections on Aristotle. 
I turn first to the question of happiness. Does the sort of human flourishing 
that Aristotle sets before us as an end comport well with Christian understand-
ings of the great drama of sin and salvation? 
SIN, SALVATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF FLOURISHING 
The conviction that humans generally are not as God meant them to be, that 
human nature itself is fallen, is central to Augustinian Christianity. Based on the 
scriptural narrative of the fall of Adam and Eve, this conviction is fleshed out in 
various accounts of the doctrine of original sin constructed by theologians and 
philosophers. lo the radical version of the doctrine proposed by Augustine him-
self, original sin is transmitted from Adam to his progeny by biological inheri-
tance, yet it brings with it individual guilt despite the fact that it is innate. In the 
milder version proposed by Schleiermacher, the sinfulness innate in the individ-
ual "is the sufficient ground of all actual sins, so that only something else outside 
of him, and not anything new within him, is needed for the generation of actual 
sin."5 In either case, humans left to themselves would not flourish in this life. Of 
course Augustinian Christianity is also convinced that humans have not been left 
to themselves; the incarnate Christ has superabundantly atoned for all human 
sin. Nevertheless such human flourishing as is possible involves a ceaseless 
struggle against interior evil. And it can never be a wholly human achievement 
but must always be at least in part a divine gift. 
Contrast this grimly realistic assessment of the human moral situation with 
the optimistic paganism of Aristotle. As Martha Nussbaum puts it, Aristotle 
"holds that human beings are naturally drawn toward virtue rather than vice, 
love more than repudiation--and that, given sufficient education, material sup-
port, and personal effort, most people will be able to make good and reasonable 
lives for themselves" [my emphasis].6 It is thus reasonable for Aristotle to think 
that human beings can, operating on their own steam, so to speak, flourish and 
so be happy over the course of an earthly lifetime. Would it be reasonable for 
Christians to share this thought? I think not. 
It might seem that Hauerwas would disagree. He professes to take it that 
"fundamental to Christian convictions is the assurance that anyone who has fol-
lowed the way of life we call Christianity will be able to look back on their life 
and say, 'I would not have it otherwise."' But actually this remark is ambiguous 
because it fails to specify the standpoint from which such a retrospective assess-
ment is to be performed. In Christian eschatological hope, there is such a stand-
point. It is loving union with God in the afterlife; there human beings will reach 
the goal for which God created them; there they will truly flourish and be happy. 
From that point of view alone will it be possible to look back on one's life as an 
earthly pilgrim and wish it unchanged. Or, at any rate, so says Christian faith. 
But that is not the standpoint from which Aristotle proposes to evaluate bu-
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man lives. Aristotle's perspective allows him to see nothing beyond completed 
earthly lives, and so he must judge flourishing and happiness in secular terms. 
From this point of view, it is quite reasonable to insist that good fortune is a pre-
requisite for human flourishing, for the activities that, according to Aristotle, 
constitute a happy life are not possible in the absence of such conditions as good 
health and a modicum of wealth. Christianity's larger vision makes other possi-
bilities available. Misfortune, far from ruling out ultimate happiness, may prove 
a blessing in disguise if it enables the one who suffers it to draw closer to the 
suffering Christ in love. Providence may be giving to the wretched of the earth--
those suffering most desperately from poverty and disease--opportunities that 
the comfortable would envy if they saw things in their true colors. This is a famil-
iar litany, but it is very remote from Aristotle's way of seeing things. At least 
some Jives in which Aristotle would not be able to find happiness will neverthe-
less, if the Christian promise is true, be crowned with a kind of happiness he at 
best only dimly imagines. 
So I see a gulf that amounts to an abyss between Aristotle and Augustinian 
Christianity on the question of happiness. For Aristotle, it is a secular human 
achievement in favorable material circumstances; for Augustinian Christianity, it 
is an otherworldly hope and must ultimately be a divine gift. This disagreement 
is bound to be reflected in further differences in the way ethics is conceived in 
the two traditions. We may therefore expect Aristotle and Augustinian Chr isti-
anity to disagree sharply over the place of the virtues in the moral life and even 
over which traits are genuine virtues. I propose next to argue that such expecta-
tions are not going to be disappointed. 
WHOSE VIRTUES? 
As has often been noted, the virtues suffer from severe cultural relativity. To 
be sure, there may be some character traits such as prudence that everyone 
needs in order to live well, but the sort of industriousness needed for flourishing 
in a bourgeois mercantile society would be out of place in a traditional African 
culture. So we should expect there to be only partial overlap between Aristotle's 
virtues and the Christian virtues. This is exactly what we find. And the differ-
ences go much deeper than the fact that many Christians would supplement 
Aristotle's list of virtues by adding to it the theological virtues of faith, hope and 
charity. 
It is striking that Aristotle does not even include piety in his long list of vir-
tues. Nussbaum conjectures that "this probably indicates his interest in separat-
ing practical reason from religious authority, and in keeping reason, rather than 
such authorities, in control of the most important matters."7 Augustinian Chris-
tians, who hold that human reason was enfeebled but not utterly corrupted by 
the fall of Adam and Eve, will quite properly be skeptical of such naive confi-
dence in the ability of human practical reason to rule well in the most important 
matters. Moreover, Aristotle clearly would not have counted as blessed all the 
people Jesus did: the poor in spirit, the sorrowing, the lowly, those who hunger 
and thirst for holiness, the merciful, the simple-hearted, the peacemakers, and 
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those who are persecuted for holiness's sake (Matthew 5:3-10). Not all such 
people would have flourished in ancient Athenian society, but Jesus promises 
them a great reward in heaven. 
Aristotle differs from Augustinian Christians not only in what he fails to 
praise but also in what he praises. As Hauerwas points out, Aristotle's high-
minded man welcomes great risks because he desires to do good but is ashamed 
to accept a good turn; "he is so because by doing good he is able to put the other 
in his debt while providing himself with an added benefit." Aristotle shows his 
astuteness as an observer of human psychology in noticing that those who regard 
themselves as self-sufficient find it easier to give than to receive. But Augustinian 
Christians should, I think, look on Aristotelian high-mindedness as a manifesta-
tion of vice rather than of virtue. It bespeaks sinful pride, if not serious self-de-
ception, not to acknowledge that we cannot be self-sufficient, that we need divine 
gifts if we are to have even a chance of overcoming interior evil and attaining 
happiness. Hauerwas is, of course, aware of the strains in Christian thought that 
would support such a judgment. In a footnote, he cites a passage in which 
Gilbert Meilaender speaks of "the Christian emphasis on grace, the sense of the 
sinner's constant need of forgiveness, and the belief that we can have no claims 
upon the freedom of God."8 He does not, in my opinion, fully appreciate how 
deeply alien the Aristotelian emphasis on self-sufficiency is to this way of think-
ing. 
But it is at another, more theoretical level that the deepest difference between 
Aristotle's conception of the virtues and the divine command moralist's concep-
tion emerges. For Aristotle, the virtues hold pride of place in ethical theory. 
They are not properly understood as dispositions to produce independently de-
fined or recognizable good actions or states of affairs; rather good actions or 
states of affairs are defined as those a virtuous person would voluntarily produce. 
From the point of view of the divine command theorist, Aristotle has got things 
backwards. The will of God, the commands that express it, and the moral laws 
those commands establish are primary for ethics, and so obligations to obey 
moral laws will be the fundamental facts of morality. Virtues will be construed as 
dispositions to obey various divine commands, and the virtue of obedience itself 
will be at center stage. Indeed, even Aquinas, who follows Aristotle as far as he 
thinks he safely can, allows that obedience is the greatest of the moral virtues 
and that all acts of virtue, insofar as they come under a precept, belong to obedi-
ence. He says that "properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby we con-
temn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the moral virtues, 
which contemn other goods for the sake of God."9 This is, I take it, a far cry 
from Aristotle. 
Yet it is part of Christian thought's legacy to modernity, transmitted by way of 
a Kantian morality of duty, that it seems perfectly natural to many people to 
think of the virtues as secondary to laws, principles or rules. Hauerwas notes this 
in passing by remarking in a footnote that most philosophers and theologians 
who write about ethics still "treat the virtues as dependent on more 'principled' 
approaches to ethics." In a way, it is puzzling to find secular moral philosophers 
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doing this. Such puzzlement seems to lie behind Eliz.abeth Anscombe's cele-
brated claim that it is not possible to have a law conception of ethics "unless you 
believe in God as a lawgiver."10 And Bernard Williams, who displays a certain 
amount of sympathy for Aristotle, regards morality, whose purest and deepest 
representation he finds in Kant's ethics of moral obligation, as something we 
would be better off without. Alluding to American slavery, he styles morality 
"the peculiar institution," though he admits that it is "the outlook, or, incoher-
ently, part of the outlook, of almost all of us."11 Doubtless our Judeo-Christian 
heritage helps explain why a morality of laws and obligations to obey them is a 
part of our outlook, and I confess to feeling a great allegiance to morality so 
understood. I also suspect that this is a point at which Christians may be called 
upon to take a stand against those who, like Williams, would like to liberate us 
from morality. Such a stand would, as I see it, also be a stand against Aristotle's 
notion of the virtues and their primacy in ethical life. 
So another abyss yawns between Aristotle and Augustinian Christianity on the 
questions of what the virtues are and of whether they are fundamental in the 
moral life. Perhaps the quarrel is at its sharpest over the nature of authority. If 
Nussbaum is right, Aristotle's view is that ethical authority lies with human prac-
tical reason and religious piety is not a virtue in the moral sphere. For Augustin-
ian Christianity, ethical authority resides in the divine will commanding and reli-
gious obedience is the greatest of moral virtues. And, as we shall next see, the 
urgency of God's claims on us will make it difficult, if not impossible, for Au-
gustinian Christians to go along with Aristotle's account of the importance of 
human friendships. 
WHICH FRIENDSHIPS? 
Jesus commanded His followers to love the Lord their God with their whole 
hearts, with their whole souls, and with all their minds (Matthew 22:37). He im-
mediately added that they should love their neighbors as themselves (Matthew 
22:39). It seems that there is tension, if not outright conflict, between these two 
commands. If we are required to devote ourselves wholeheartedly and totally to 
love of God, then we may not have left over time or energy enough to do a 
proper job of loving either self or neighbor. So perhaps Christians will have to 
confront hard choices between divine friendship and human friendships of cer-
tain sorts. This is what Robert M. Adams calls the problem of total devotion. 12 
Total devotion to God appears to press us in the direction of exclusive devotion 
to God. 
Augustine responds to the pressure by downplaying the importance of human 
friendships. In a famous but troubling passage, he cites the commandment to 
love the neighbor and goes on to ask whether man is to be loved by man for his 
own sake or for the sake of something else. Appealing to a distinction between 
enjoyment and use, he says: "If for his own sake, we enjoy him; if for the sake of 
something else, we use hirn."13 Augustine then registers his own conviction that 
man is to be loved for the sake of something else, from which it follows that hu-
man love of self and others should be a matter of use. Referring back to the 
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commandment to love God with all one's heart, soul and mind, Augustine re-
marks that God "did not leave any part of life which should be free and find it-
self room to desire the enjoyment of something else."14 And from this it follows 
that human love of self and others should not be a matter of enjoyment. So it 
appears that for Augustine friendships among humans are to be restricted to the 
realm of the useful. 
This position stands in sharp contrast to Aristotle's views on human friend-
ship. As Hauerwas points out, Aristotle holds that the highest form of human 
friendship obtains between good people who are alike in excellence or virtue. In 
such friendships between virtuous equals, the friends find joy in one another. 
Utility friendships and pleasure friendships are, for Aristotle, only inferior forms 
of friendship; indeed, they are only called friendship by analogy because they 
bear some resemblance to virtue friendships. Aristotle's ideal of friendship tran-
scends the bounds of the useful and makes room for equals in virtue to enjoy 
and take pleasure in one another's good qualities of character. 
Even Augustinian Christians may not wish to adopt Augustine's own severe 
attitude toward human friendships, and so perhaps the stark contrast between 
Augustine and Aristotle on this point can be mitigated if not entirely eliminated. 
One way for Christians to proceed, it seems to me, is to suppose that God wishes 
us to love ourselves and our neighbors as He loves them. Lacking nothing, God 
does not love His creatures because they are useful to Him but for their own 
sakes; knowing that His creation is good, God delights in it. If we do likewise, it 
will not interfere with whole-hearted devotion to God but will strengthen it by 
uniting us more closely to Him in shared activity. Thus, Augustine notwithstand-
ing, God did leave a part of life free for loving creatures for their own sakes and 
for enjoying one another. Total devotion to God does not entail exclusive devo-
tion to God because our love should diffuse itself over the whole of creation as 
His does. In this respect, Francis of Assisi is the exemplary Christian saint. 
But this line of thought, though it softens the clash between Aristotle and Au-
Christianity in one way, only serves to heighten the contrast between 
:hem in another. Aristotle restricts the highest kind of friendship to good people 
ivho are equal in virtue and insists that we must be satisfied with only a few 
'riends of this kind. This does not mean, as Hauerwas takes pains to emphasize, 
hat Aristotelian virtue friendships are limited by gender or social class, for man 
lDd woman, slave and free can be equal in virtue. It does mean, however, that 
\ristotle's ideal of friendship is much less inclusive than the ideal of love of 
1eighbor if that Christian ideal is understood, as the parable of the Good Sa-
11aritan suggests it should be, to imply that our love of one another should be a 
eflection, albeit a pale one, of God's love for us. Surely God's love is not re-
tricted to His equals in excellence or virtue. If it were, it would not reach out 
eyond the boundaries of the Trinity to seek us. And plainly God's love is not 
mited to the virtuous among His human creatures. If there is no love between 
iod and a human creature, it is not because God has not offered love but be-
rnse the creature has refused it. The atoning work of Christ's suffering and 
is, after all, a gift to all humankind. If that is the paradigm we are to imi-
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tate, then Christian love of neighbor must be on offer to all and cannot be con-
fined, without being stunted in its growth, to the narrow circle of one's equals in 
virtue. No doubt space can be made inside the realm of Christian love for some-
thing like Aristotle's virtue friendships as well as for other attractive forms of 
interpersonal bonding. What needs to be emphasized, however, is that Christian 
love lays on us much more extensive and stringent demands than Aristotelian 
friendship does. 
"It is interesting," Hauerwas notes near the end of his discussion of friend-
ship, " that Jesus does not ask the disciples to be friends, but he commands them 
to be friends." Indeed, it is interesting; but from my point of view it is not sur-
prising. Hauerwas is commenting on the passage in Christ's last discourse which 
says: "The command I give you is this, that you love one another" (John 15:17). 
It is easy to see how Aristotelian friendships between equals in virtue could arise 
spontaneously and naturally. According to the old saw, like is attracted to like, 
and virtue friendships are defined as relationships between those alike in their 
excellences. But even Christ's first disciples were a mixed bag, and his followers 
today are a very motley crew. So the requirement that they love one another will 
not necessarily square with their natural inclinations and must have the con-
straining force of a command. There is, however, nothing special about this case. 
As Augustinian Christians see it, our moral obligations are generally contrary to 
the rebellious tendencies of the Old Adam within us; and as we divine command 
theorists would insist, they are imposed on us by a God who by right lays down 
the law for us. 
CONCLUSION 
In biology, taxonomists are often divided into lumpers and splitters. Lumpers 
stress similarities and downplay differences; splitters draw attention to differ-
ences and deemphasize similarities. Those who, like Aquinas and Hauerwas, 
wish to appropriate Aristotle's pagan wisdom· for Christian ethical thought tend 
to be lumpers. These comments should make it very clear that I am a splitter by 
temperament. Wishing to highlight what is distinctive in Christian ethical 
thought, I picture Aristotle as deeply alien to it and so find attempts to assimilate 
his pagan wisdom to Augustinian Christianity problematic at best. I think Aris-
totle should be read with suspicion by Christian theologians and philosophers. 
But Christian ethics is the property of a community, not of a single individual. If 
the community is to learn to correct for the tendencies to exaggerate manifest in 
the work of both lumpers and splitters, it will have to discover how to give due 
weight to both similarities and differences between Athens and Jerusalem. So we 
splitters should be grateful for the work of lumpers like Hauerwas; such work 
provides a counterweight to our propensities to make too much of differences. 
And, speaking personally, though I continue to disagree with Hauerwas over 
matters of substance and emphasis of the sort I have endeavored to bring to the 
fore in these comments, it is only fair to conclude by acknowledging that thinking 
about his reflections on Aristotle's ethics has helped me to clarify and deepen 
my own vision of what Christian ethics is and should be. 
Is Athens Jerusalem Dtnied? 57 
Notes 
1. Alasdair Macintyre, J.Wiose Justice: J.Wiich Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988). 
2. For selected texts, see Janine Marie ldziak, ed., Divine Comm011d Morality: Historical 
Olld Contemporary Readings (New Yorlc and Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1979). 
3. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, tr. T . M. Greene and 
H. H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 91. 
4. Ibid., p. 37. 
5. Friedrich Schleiermacher, The ChristiOll Faith, ed. H. R. MacKintosh and J. S. Stewart 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 286. 
6. Martha Nussbaum, "Recoiling from Reason," The New YOl"k Review of Books 
(December 7, 1989), p. 40. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Gilbert Meilaender, The Theory Olld Practice of Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. x. 
9. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae, 104, 3. 
10. Elizabeth Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," Collected Papers; Volume III: 
Ethics, Religion, 011d Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p. 30. 
11. Bernard Williams, Ethics Olld the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1985), p. 174. 
12. Robert Merrihew Adams, "The Problem of Total Devotion," Rationality, Religious 
Belief, Olld Moral Commitment, ed. R. Audi and W. J. Wainwright {Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 169-194. I have found this excellent paper very 
helpful in clarifying my own thoughts on the problem. 
13.Augustine, De Doctn·na Christi011a, 1, 22, 20. 
14. Ibid., 1, 22, 21. 

Athens May Be a Long Way 
From Jerusalem 
But Prussia Is Even Further 
STANLEY HAUERWAS 
I am indebted to Philip Quinn for putting me in a new predicament. Usually I 
am accused of being a radical Christian voice that overemphasizes God's re-
demption so that the created order is undervalued. My emphasis on the distinc-
tive character of Christian ethics is alleged to make impossible any attempt to 
benefit from non-Christian wisdom. But according to Quinn the problem is ex-
actly the reverse as I come close to domesticating the radical nature of the gos-
pel of Christ by making Aristotle part of the Christian tradition. Caught between 
these unhappy characterizations I can only think I am either very confused or, 
given the intellectual options of modernity, what I am about is not easily under-
stood. I suspect there is some truth in both characterizations, but I am going to 
try to clear up some of the confusions by responding to Quinn. 
I must begin by rejecting Quinn's own self-description as a "splitter." The 
very distinction between "Jumpers" and "splitters" is one generated by one well 
initiated into intellectual practices of lumping. I do not say that in criticism, for 
as Quinn points out, any significant attempt at ethical theory--which is not the 
same thing as attempts to illumine how we should live as Christians--will entail a 
genealogical narrative that inevitably lumps. My problem is not that Quinn is a 
lumper, but rather that I find his narrative unbelievable. 
His story goes something like this: Things were going well for Christians as 
long as they followed God's commands and asked for forgiveness when they dis-
obeyed those commands. This lasted for approximately the first four centuries of 
Christian history and climaxed in the thought of Augustine. However, Christians 
became attracted to pagan thinkers and the result was a terrible loss of Christian 
insight. While there was some hope in later scholastic sources, the decisive redis-
Stanley Haueiwas, Ph.D., is professor of theological ethics at The Divinity School, 
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pal1 series of essays on Aristotelian themes from Dr. Philip L. Quinn, professor of 
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covery of Christian morality occurred in the Reformation and climaxed in the 
eighteenth century with Kant. This renewal of Christian ethics, however, has not 
fared well in modernity. It now becomes our task as Christians to preserve ethics 
of duty in a liberal culture based on utilitarianism. 
To begin, I think it extraordinary that Quinn seems to believe that the great 
alternatives are between something called "paganism" and "Augustinian Christi-
anity." Does he really believe that Augustine represents Christianity that has not 
already been shaped by pagan influences? Augustine, after all, was not exactly 
innocent of Platonism. Why is Platonic paganism good but Aristotelian paganism 
bad? Moreover, the very appeal to Augustine as the great hero of Quinn's story 
is odd since Augustine's display of the Christian life in The Morals of the Catho-
lic Church is in the language of the virtues--admittedly all as forms of love, but 
still a long way from Kant's ethic of duty qua duty. 
I confess that I prefer Aristotle's account of the virtues to that of Plato be-
cause, as I tried to show in my articles, Aristotle's account of the virtues as habits 
inextricably requires an account of temporality. (It may well be true, as Macin-
tyre argues, that the difference between Plato's and Aristotle's account of the 
moral life has been overdrawn. Yet certainly the Plato that Augustine learned 
through neo-Platonism was far from Aristotle's account of the virtues.) Such 
timefulness, I think, at least provides an opening for Christian appropriation of 
the virtues now determined by the story we tell of Jesus of Nazareth. Platonic 
accounts of Christianity always tend toward gnosticism as Jesus simply becomes 
an exemplar of prior existing truth. Interestingly, it is Aristotle that allows for a 
decisive reconstitution of the virtues as well as their individuation as determined 
by faithfulness to Jesus. 
So, ironically, my attempt to use the "pagan" Aristotle was in the interest of 
my more determinative theological interest in displaying how the Christian con-
viction that Jesus is God's messiah requires a radical revision of Aristotle's 
understanding of the virtues. Yet such a radical revision is still a revision as God 
does not redeem us in the abstract but as people who are constituted in and by 
concrete histories. It is my sense that Aristotle's account of the virtues, and in 
particular how the virtues are interrelated to happiness and friendship, can help 
Christians understand better bow we are called to live as disciples of Jesus. 
Yet I must acknowledge that there are other, equally possible, accounts of 
bow we should live as Christians that make no mention of Aristotle and/or the 
virtues. It is not as if the New Testament is devoid of the language of virtue, 1 but 
discipleship is surely a more prominent category. The crucial issue is not 
whether virtue or command is more determinative, but rather whether whatever 
conceptual alternative we use helps us as Christians to be more faithful disciples. 
What must be acknowledged, however, is that there is no "pure" Christianity 
anywhere--particularly in the New Testament and/or Augustine. 
Of course Quinn is right that Aristotle has no conception of sin, but the prob-
lem with Quinn's way of putting the matter is that it makes it appear that sin is 
the first word Christians have to speak about the moral life. Our first word is not 
sin, but that Jesus is the Christ. Our sin can only be known in the light of Jesus' 
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cross. That is why the gospel is good news and proclamation. Christ did not 
come to condemn the world, but to save it--we are only condemned because we 
are first saved. 
Ironically, Quinn's understanding of sin, as well as the status he gives it, is not 
unlike Protestant liberal theology's attempt to make sin a form of natural theol-
ogy. No longer believing that all creation is intelligible only as it manifests God's 
glory, Protestants retreated to sin as a natural category that could be known ab-
stracted from Christ. Of course the great paradigm of this is Quinn's hero--Im-
manuel Kant. I suspect that Quinn thinks he can have Kant's account of duty and 
sin without having Kant's account of Jesus in Religion Within the Limits of Rea-
son Alone. If so, he certainly owes us an account of that neat trick. For Kant, sin 
is a more determinative reality than the Jesus who is, for Kant, but the exemplifi-
cation of the archetype already present to reason. Kant and Plato alike have no 
place for truth that is historically contingent. 
None of this is meant to deny that sin is a crucial issue for how we think of 
these matters. As Quinn notes, Martha Nussbaum, in her recent review of 
Maclntyre's mtose Justice? mtich Rationality?, criticizes Macintyre for taking 
seriously the Christian doctrine of sin.z Nussbaum's account of Augustine's 
understanding of sin as sexual desire is badly off target as well as how she under-
stands the relation of sin, rationality and authority. Nonetheless she has put her 
finger on one of the fundamental issues between Christians and the ethos of 
modernity. For she is quite right to suggest that the project of modernity to se-
cure moral agreement through the construction of common norms requires the 
suppression of the Christian confession of sin. Yet she, like Quinn, seems to as-
;ume that sin is intelligible separate from the more determinative witness we 
nake as Christians that our existence is determined for the enjoyment of God 
'orever made sure through the resurrection of Christ.3 
What I find so troubling about Quinn's appeal to a "morality of duty" is his 
ailure to see that there is no "divine command tradition of Christian ethics." In-
leed I think we would be hard pressed to discover such a tradition in Christian-
ty before Kant. To be sure, there are commands of all kinds and types through 
lie Christian Scriptures, but they are never assumed to be intelligible separate 
:om the story of what it means to be Israel and/or the Church. Commands, like 
te virtues, require a narrative context for their intelligibility. I, along with many 
thers, have argued this time and time again, but it seems to have no effect for 
1ose determined that the Scriptures are best read through Kantian eyes. 
In that respect I think Quinn is right to see the Reformation as playing a deci-
ve role. But it is not as he would have it, namely that the Reformers liberated 
ugustinian Christianity from pagan influences, but rather that the Reformation 
:gan the process that handed the authority of the Church to the secular state. 
was certainly not what the Reformers intended, but it was the inevitable re-
It of the divorce of scriptural authority from the magisterial authority of the 
mrch. The ethics of duty becomes the theological necessity for assuring the 
1edience of the individual to state control. That Protestant ethics was so shaped 
but a manifestation of the inability of Protestantism to challenge the idolatry 
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intrinsic to the rise of the modern nation state. That the moral life of Protes-
tants, particularly in the United States, has been degraded into forms of bour-
geois self-fulfillment is ironically the result of the development of duty-formed 
ethics abstracted from any account of goods necessary for our flourishing.4 So if 
Quinn is unhappy with liberal modernity, I suggest he ought to remember the 
immortal words of Pogo--"We have met the enemy and he is us." 
Quinn cannot, of course, be held accountable for failing to intuit the political 
agenda that is the background to my articles on Aristotle, since I certainly did 
not make that explicit. Yet the very way I tried to interrelate happiness, the life 
of virtue, and friendship was meant to suggest why those themes are so destruc-
tively separated by our current political arrangements. I should have thought that 
Quinn might have noticed how Aristotle's understanding of the relationship be-
tween politics and friendship is a decisive challenge to liberal political regimens 
that thrive on the Kantian presumptions that the primary moral issue is how to 
secure fair relations between strangers. To be a community capable of fostering 
friendships, as I believe the Church is and should be, is a significant political wit-
ness in such a world. 
I must admit that Quinn's general argument about the necessity to provide a 
genealogy of "ethics" does raise a challenge to which I am unsure how to re-
spond. He rightly associates me with the narrative Macintyre tells of the Chris-
tian appropriation of Aristotle. What concerns me is not whether this is a pa-
ganization of Christianity, but rather whether grand narratives such as Macintyre 
constructs do not remain committed to some form of Constantinian Christianity 
and, thus, legitimate forms of dominations antithetical to Christian friendship. 
This remains a challenge to me. I am convinced there is no way around such nar-
ratives if we are to resist the powers of modernity. Yet I fear those very narra-
tives may become the master rather than the servant to the gospel. That is why 
Maclntyre's argument about Aquinas's method of disputation is necessary for 
any account of Christian truth is so important. That "method" makes clear that 
Christians believe that "reason" is an ongoing process in which even the weakest 
member must have a voice. 
That is why I find Nussbaum's critique of Maclntyre's account of practical ra-
tionality as authoritarian so bizarre. In After Virtue where Macintyre used the 
example of chess, Nussbaum suggests he still has a place for critical reason, but 
by employing the hockey player example in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
Macintyre allegedly wishes people to be characterized by unthinking conformity. 
Nussbaum's argument not only betrays a shocking ignorance of the skill required 
to pass a hockey puck at the right time and in the right manner, but even more 
she does not appreciate how rationality but names the process by which a com-
munity discovers the goods in common. In spite of her illuminating account of 
Aristotle, Nussbaum, in some of her work, continues to hanker after an account 
of "critical reason" more characteristic of Kant than Aristotle. It may be that 
Maclntyre's account of rationality is too " rationalistic," but at least he begins the 
process of helping us recover an account of rationality as correlative to social 
process. For Christians this at least means that our convictions will, of course. 
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appear arbitrary when we are less than a people formed to be friends of God 
and one another. 
The issues Quinn raises concerning the relation of friendship and love are not 
easily sorted out. I certainly would not want to suggest that the Christian obliga-
tion to love the neighbor is the same as becoming the neighbor's friend. How-
ever, I think it equally important to resist construal of Christian agape in terms 
of the Kantian notion of disinterestedness that has been so prevalent in modern 
theology and ethics. Impartial love is not love but false egalitarianism that 
threatens the being of one so "loved." 
In terms of Quinn's more particular criticism of the position I tried to de-
velop, I am content to let the articles speak for themselves. I am grateful to him 
for providing me the opportunity to at least suggest the larger agenda behind 
them. Though I am unhappy with the current disciplinary distinction between 
theology and philosophy, I suspect behind this disagreement between Quinn and 
myself lies the difference between the theologian and the philosopher.s 
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Living in Between. Durham, North Carolina: Labyrinth Press, 1988. 
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For Lent I gave up writing book reviews. Most readers will assume that such a 
decision hardly demanded a sacrifice, but they would be sadly mistaken, for I am 
currently suffering from a malaise common to post-prelim graduate students 
know as DAH (pronounced "duh")--Dissertation Avoidance Hysteria. No cure 
currently exists for DAH, and so those of us who suffer from it must resort to 
treating the symptoms: frequent headaches, uncontrollable stuttering when que-
ried about either the topic of our dissertations or progress recently made, and 
unbounded enthusiasm for any and every project that may divert us from our 
appointed task. And so in order to survive a disease that can easily metastasize 
and infect every area of one's life (and which in some cases is terminal), I've 
taken to popping aspirin, practicing silence and eschewing the writing of book 
reVIews. 
That is, I did so until I read Stanley Hauerwas's latest offering. 
I should perhaps explain, since the reasons for ending my self-imposed mora-
torium, even at great risk to my future well-being, might easily be misinter-
preted. I decided to write this review not because I believed Hauerwas's most 
recent musings were so profound that I simply had to get the word out. Nor did I 
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undertake this project merely to be able to add yet another entry to my impres-
sive list of publications appearing in prestigious journals. Rather, I embarked on 
this mission because Hauerwas taught me an important lesson: that Christians 
are called to be a people who have (or create) time for the trivial. This insight 
(to which I will later return) struck me as so revolutionary that I decided to in- . 
corporate it into my way of life. Hence, when I was approached by the editor of 
this journal to offer some reflections on Christian Existence Today, I thought to 
myself: "How better to embody concretely my new found appreciation for and 
commitment to the trivial?" 
Before I proceed to important matters, perhaps I may appropriately begin 
with a somewhat trivial aside. As his students know, Hauerwas refers to this col-
lection rather affectionately as Christian Existence Yesterday, since the editor of 
Labyrinth Press (who will remain anonymous) possessed the manuscript for no 
trivial amount of time before he was able to bring it out. Of course, Hauerwas 
was inhibited from asking for a title change, for to have done so would have ob-
scured his allusion to Barth's short tract, Theological Existence Today. Some 
cynical readers, undoubtedly, will deny that the two works have anything in com-
mon ("I knew Karl Barth. Karl Barth was a fr iend of mine .... "). The one possible 
exception might be the length of time taken to write each: Barth makes no secret 
that his work was written over a single weekend. 
Concerning more important matters, let me begin by noting that, not surpris-
ingly, many of the issues that arise in this latest collection of essays are those 
which Hauerwas's readers have come to expect: virtue, narrative, practical rea-
son, moral formation and peace. But it would be a mistake to assume from this 
that CET is merely another attempt by Hauerwas to use these notions to launch 
his latest diatribe against the poverty of American Christian ethics. Rather, like 
most of us, the more be writes about these matters, the more clarity and preci-
sion be attains. Since Hauerwas rightly believes that thinking and writing should 
normally not be distinguished, those who have read his works to this point have 
had the opportunity to "see" him think through these issues. Hauerwas readily 
admits that his "project" remains unfinished (and is therefore inadequately char-
acterized as a "project"), and whatever advances it provides depend on the dia-
logical character of his discourse. That is, Hauerwas, more than some authors, 
wants and needs his readers and critics. This willingness to allow others to look 
over his shoulder stems from his belief that having the right "position" or "an-
swer" is not enough; a person must be clear about how she got there. Otherwise, 
there is no way of knowing whether one has arrived at "the same" position or 
not, or whether one has arrived anywhere at all. None of this, of course, is meant 
to imply that Hauerwas's latest book finally clarifies everything; however, there 
are several aspects of his thinking that are presented with a good deal more lu-
cidity, and as such have the potential to help us understand more clearly what 
Hauerwas is about. Perhaps the biggest payoff of such clarity is that it may make 
it possible for us to know better how to have a disagreement with him. 
Of course, Hauerwas would approve of this, for he is in the business of engen-
dering disagreement. Hence, it is quite fitting that Hauerwas introduces his lat-
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est collection by responding to the now well-known accusation leveled by his for-
mer teacher and long-time friend, James Gustafson. For those unfamiliar with 
the details, Gustafson accuses Hauerwas of succumbing to the so-called "sectar-
ian temptation." This temptation, according to Gustafson, stems from the fact 
that Christianity's identity is threatened by the pluralism that marks contempo-
rary societies. As a result, this threat naturally generates a conservative, or sec-
tarian, reaction that attempts to regain a distinct sense of identity for Christianity 
by resorting to a strategy of "sectarian withdrawal." This withdrawal is but-
tressed by Hauerwas and others whose theoretical positions, according to Gus-
tafson, entail "theological fideism" and "sociological tribalism." 
Hauerwas acknowledges that part of his reason for beginning with his dis-
agreement with Gustafson is to provide a touchstone for the remainder of the 
book; that is, readers will be able to test his "defense" of his position in the in-
troduction against the constructive proposals that are displayed throughout the 
book. But perhaps more importantly, Hauerwas's introduction reminds readers 
that what is at stake in reading and responding to arguments is not so much "de-
fending'' this or that "position"; rather, it is coming to understand that persons 
are often "captured" by certain habits of mind and life that deeply affect the way 
they see the world. Thus, Hauerwas shows his readers that to disagree with Gus-
tafson involves not merely denying the latter's charges of sectarianism, tribalism, 
fideism, irresponsibility and the like, but more basically coming to conceptual 
clarity about why Gustafson "sees" the problems in these terms to begin with, 
and subsequently, why one perhaps might want to deny Gustafson's descriptions. 
In short, Hauerwas's introduction helps the reader understand one of the pri-
nary philosophical issues that Hauerwas variously displays throughout his book: 
trguments, including moral arguments, cannot be separated from the descrip-
ions that not merely accompany them, but make them possible. Hence, moral 
trgurnent often entails the complex process of persuading an audience that they 
1eed not, perhaps even must not, accept the first stage of any argument; indeed, 
ierhaps the only stage necessary to throw into relief what is at issue, is rede-
cription. 
So Hauerwas carefully sketches out in his introduction, and then further sug-
ests in his later chapters, why he rejects Gustafson's characterization of his po-
tion. Hauerwas begins by admitting that if bis "position" is a temptation, he 
::>pes people will succumb to it; however, he rejects Gustafson's notion that giv-
.g in to such a temptation necessarily opens one to the charge of "sectarian-
m." Hauerwas rightly notes that such a charge begs the very epistemological 
1d sociological questions that are at issue, while appearing to stand above them. 
other words, the charge of sectarianism often serves as a cipher for little more 
an "you are wrong not to take responsibility for the world in the way that I 
1." In other words, such a charge serves to mask the fact that how the Church 
.derstands and exercises its responsibility to the world is precisely the point at 
ue, and one on which Hauerwas has written at length. That Hauerwas is weary 
having those arguments summarily dismissed as "sectarian" is evident in bis 
ssionate rebuttal to those who have leveled such charges: "Show me where I 
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am wrong about God, Jesus, the limits of liberalism, the nature of the virtues, or 
the doctrine of the church--but do not shortcut that task by calling me a sectar-
ian" (p. 8). 
Similarly, Hauerwas argues that Gustafson's charge of " irresponsibility" 
wrongly presupposes that Christians must take up an "all or nothing" attitude 
toward a "given" society. That Hauerwas rejects such a view is attested to by one 
of the themes that runs throughout this collection (and many of bis other writ-
ings): That part of what the Church is called to be is a people of virtue capable 
of making judgments about what it can and cannot affirm about the society in 
which it finds itself. "The issue," Hauerwas asserts, "is how the church can pro-
vide the interpretative categories to help Christians better understand the posi-
tive and negative aspects of their societies and guide their subsequent selective 
participation" (p. 11). Such interpretive categories, in turn, are only "available" 
if the community sustains certain practices that are capable of throwing into re-
lief those aspects of a society which they cannot affirm. For example, Hauerwas 
believes that Christian communities must denounce the state's willingness to re-
sort to violence, but they can only do so to the extent that they embody that vir-
tue which is essential for their life and witness to the world, the virtue of peace-
making. 
Although Hauerwas has written much on this in the past, his brief essay 
"Peacemaking: The Virtue of the Church" contains perhaps his most clear and 
succinct thinking on why this virtue must remain integral for all communities 
who purport to follow Jesus. This essay, which consists of his extended reflec-
tions on Matthew 18:15-22, helpfully displays the relationship between the virtue 
of peacemaking and a theological understanding of who Christians believe them-
selves to be as members of communities that attempt to follow Jesus. Under-
standing such a relationship requires seeing the connection between a commu-
nity's call to live as forgiven people and the fact that to the extent to which it 
commits itself to the truth, such a community will necessarily engender conflict. 
Hauerwas recognizes that the difficult question is how to conjoin in one commu-
nity those two seemingly irreconcilable practices: on the one band, that each 
Christian community is called to be that place where forgiveness is always avail-
able; and on the other hand, that each community, in calling its members to ac-
countability to the truth of Jesus Christ, is called to make judgments that often 
exacerbate conflict. That these two practices appear irreconcilable is itself, Hau-
erwas suggests, indicative of the problem. Part of the problem stems from the 
fact that our notion of "peace" is seldom theologically informed; that is, our no-
tion of peace is often indistinguishable from that truncated view of peace as the 
complete absence of conflict, that "false peace of the world which is too often 
built more on power than truth" (p. 95). Such a notion hinders us from recogniz-
ing that genuine peacemaking cannot be separated from the practice of speaking 
the truth; however, such truth-speaking is directed not first of all to the world, 
but to ourselves. Such a posture has the potential to transform the nature of con-
frontation both within and without the community, for it reminds us that "we 
confront one another not as forgivers, not as those who use forgiveness as 
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power, but first and foremost as people who have learned the truth about our-
selves--namely, that we are all people who need to be and have been forgiven" 
(pp. 93-94). 
Hauerwas also helpfully illuminates the Christian virtue of hope in his essay 
(written with Thomas Shaffer) entitled "Hope Faces Power: Thomas More and 
the King of England." This essay serves as a powerful example of a point that 
Hauerwas never fails to emphasize: Theological/moral judgments cannot be 
made in the abstract, but require that a people malce discriminations in concrete 
situations. That such is the case is one reason Hauerwas spends so much energy 
exploring the relationships between character, virtue and the story of a particular 
people. But what Hauerwas does in this and several other essays throughout this 
collection is to display these relationships with an illuminating concreteness that 
stems from his ability to weave together theological/moral reflection and per-
sonal narrative. That is, by telling More's story in a particular way, Hauerwas 
had greatly enriched our theological/moral imaginations by helping us see how 
inseparable were More's life and his theological/moral commitments. 
These above-mentioned essays are but two examples of how themes which 
have held a prominent place in Hauerwas's thinking--peacemaking and hope--
continue to be fleshed out in this latest collection. What is perhaps most encour-
aging about this fleshing out is how Hauerwas has gone about doing it. First, I 
think it is fair to say that in his latest offering Hauerwas has virtually stopped 
talking about "narrative" as an abstraction and has increasingly moved toward 
!ngaging particular narratives, a strategy which has allowed him to exhibit pow-
:rfully how it is that these narratives are essential to argument. Similarly, Hauer-
vas tends to say less these days about "virtue" in the abstract and more about 
pecifically Christian virtues--that is, more about how the story of Jes us and 
hose who follow Him makes a difference to how these virtues are construed by 
nd embodied in particular communities. Equally promising is that both of the 
bove trends have made it possible, indeed necessary, for Hauerwas to engage 
10re directly with Christian Scripture. 
It is tempting to offer further specific comments about other essays in the col-
ction, such as how Hauerwas talks about practical reason in ways that might 
.alee it possible to rehabilitate casuistry as a legitimate Christian moral practice; 
>W his recurrent theme of moral formation looks when he reflects on the place 
· "formal" education, and especially so-called "Christian" education; or how his 
1derstanding of "character" plays out when it is directed toward the character 
those who have a special call to be ministers of the gospel. But I'll resist such 
notating, which might mislead some people into thinking that they needn't 
id the book, and concentrate the remainder of my reflections on what is per-
ps the most provocative and suggestive theme that runs throughout these es-
1s: the theme of time. 
Somewhat ironically, that the issue of time flows as a persistent undercurrent 
oughout these pages is a tribute to the positive influence of Gustafson. In fact, 
! might go as far as to say that the prominent place which the issue of time 
; in Hauerwas's thought is unintelligible apart from Gustafson's reflections on 
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the relationship of time and community, particularly as Gustafson displays it in 
several chapters (and in the appendix, which is a summary of Gustafson's disser-
tation) of Treasure in Earthen Vessels. In short, Gustafson argues that time is 
constitutive of community in that the latter is such only insofar as it is a commu-
nity of language, of interpretation, of memory and understanding, and of belief 
and action. Each of these constitutive aspects of all human communities (includ-
ing the Church) are thoroughly infused by temporality; that is, they are pene-
trated throughout by the dialectical forces of the past, present and future. 
That Hauerwas has learned these lessons well hardly requires substantiation. 
Regular readers of Hauerwas need only be reminded of the prominent place of 
concepts such as narrative, description, remembering and conviction, to see how 
thoroughly Hauerwas has internalized the important place of time in any discus-
sion of community. The central issue for any such discussion is that of continuity 
and/or identity over time. As Gustafson notes, there are usually important 
analogies between how one understands the self and time and how one under-
stands community. But Hauerwas, perhaps more than most of the philosophers 
whom Gustafson deals with, attempts to integrate more fully the dialectical rela-
tionship between the self and community, both of which are thoroughly im-
mersed in time. One of the ways Hauerwas keeps the dialectic operative is by 
insisting that community is prior to the self; that is, it is a mistake lo start from a 
construal of the self and then move to an understanding of community. Hence, 
with regard to the self and its continuity /identity over time, Hauerwas suggests 
that no such continuity/identity is possible apart from that selfs "character" and 
its ability to situate itself coherently within a narrative (which may amount to the 
same thing)--both of which are irreducibly communal. Likewise, Hauerwas's 
concern for the continuity of self and community over time is the reason for his 
emphasis on virtue, for "the virtues bind our past with our future by providing us 
with the continuity of self' (p. 265). With regard to the continuity /identity of the 
Christian community over time, Hauerwas points first of all not to the "charac-
ter" of the Church, but to the faithful character of God as most fully revealed in 
the story of Israel and Jesus of Nazareth, and as remembered, embodied and 
performed by those who have been called to radical discipleship. Hence, all of 
the categories that have become the hallmark of Hauerwas's work--character, 
narrative, memory, virtue--all are attempts to make connections between the 
selfs communal nature and the community's irreducibly temporal character. 
But it may well be that Hauerwas has pushed the importance of time even 
further than did Gustafson, or at least in directions which the latter never seri-
ously considered. This is particularly the case with Hauerwas's emphasis on the 
"eschatological" character of Christian communities, a category about which he 
remained somewhat oblique in his earlier writings, but about which he is noY 
beginning to demonstrate some lucidity. This emphasis surfaces, for example, i1 
his insistence that salvation involves the "creation of a timeful people" (p. 50 
whose existence on behalf of the world creates "a space and time in which w 
might have a foretaste of the Kingdom" (p. 106). 
The notion that salvation involves the creation of a timeful people is criticc 
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for Hauerwas for several reasons. First, it avoids the problem with many "classi-
cal" theories of the atonement, which, by framing the discussion of salvation by 
means of the abstract category of "atonement," malces it possible, if not neces-
sary, to spealc of salvation apart from the community which such salvation cre-
ates. Such theories tend toward gnosticism in that they suggest that salvation in-
volves little more than God's "work" and our knowledge of it. But Hauerwas in-
sists that salvation is not simply a matter of knowledge, of knowing that we are a 
people who are "saved"; rather, salvation involves being saved "to" something (a 
new people) which is inseparable from, indeed simply is, salvation itself. 
Second, by emphasizing salvation as the creation of an eschatological commu-
nity, Hauerwas suggests that it may not be possible to know what salvation 
means apart from such a community; that is, it may be that salvation is so closely 
tied to what it means to be such an eschatological community--a community 
whose very life together is an important, albeit an insufficient, expression of the 
presence of the Kingdom--that one should not, perhaps cannot, frame the issue 
of salvation apart from participation in such a community. Said in a different 
way, Hauerwas reminds us that salvation must reach to the very core of what it 
means to be human, which, without appearing to "essentialize" what we mean by 
the "human," can be affirmed to be irreducibly temporal; that is, all that we 
"are" (or hope to be) is inextricably connected with the fact that we belong to 
communities of language, of interpretation, of memory and understanding, and 
of belief and action, all of which are thoroughly infused with temporality. So 
whatever else salvation may be, Hauerwas is right to suggest that God cannot 
truly "save" us while ignoring the fact that we need to be redeemed from the 
tyrannies of time that enslave us. We need a "new" time. But any " time" that 
will really be "new" must necessarily involve the "redemption" of our language, 
nterpretations, memories, beliefs, actions, and the like. (This, I take it, is part of 
,..hat Hauerwas means to imply by the title of one of his essays: "The Church as 
:Jod's New Language.") Because this is the case, Hauerwas is right to insist that 
ucb a new, eschatological "time" cannot come to us apart from a community 
hat is involved in the very temporally-infused activities noted above. Thus, we 
annot be saved from the tyranny of time apart from the creation of a " timeful" 
eople, a people who institute a new, escbatological relationship to time. 
Finally, by emphasizing the "timeful" and therefore communal nature of sal-
ttion, Hauerwas bas perhaps done us the greatest service by "historicizing" 
hat salvation must be in twentieth-century America. It is not enough simply to 
y that what it means to be human is irreducibly temporal, for how humans ex-
:rience time in a given culture is all important. While I cannot do justice here 
the complex structures of time instituted within modern capitalist societies, 
rhaps it is enough to be reminded of how such societies encourage a calculat-
and economizing attitude toward time. The fact that we speak of time as 
nething we can spend, save, waste, use and buy is only one indication of bow 
:h societies transform time into another, if not the most valuable, commodity. 
t that Christians have been redeemed is another way of saying that they have 
!n brought into a community that embodies the truth that time is ultimately a 
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gift. A people whose lives are marked by this gratuitousness can "afford" to take 
time for the trivial, for they have been freed from the tyranny of thinking that 
their ultimate destiny and happiness is tied to how they "spend" their time. This 
freedom makes it possible for a "new'' time to appear, a time for caring for 
those who do not promise to make the world a better place, a time for being 
with those who do not promise to contribute to our status, a time for entering 
into the gratuitous and joyful worship of a God who does not promise that things 
will always work out " right." 
Of course, to the extent that Christian communities fail to embody such re-
demption, that is, to the extent that they fail to embody such freedom from the 
tyranny of economized time, their redemption/sanctification remains seriously 
incomplete. But to the extent that they engage in practices which challenge this 
reigning view of time, we may confidently assert that there the kingdom is break-
ing in, there the eschatological is being realized. 
Hauerwas has many more provocative things to say about time, such as its in-
timate relationship to peace, and its ability to create the "space" necessary to 
resist the totalitarian powers that would drain our lives of their meaning. But 
perhaps I have pointed to enough to suggest how potentially integrating such an 
understanding of time might be. In short, we can thank Hauerwas for helping us 
to see how we might move away from thinking of the distinction between Church 
and world primarily in spatial categories. By suggesting that much of what is im-
portant about this crucial distinction is missed when we fail to construe it in tem-
poral categories--as the distinction between two aeons, as Yoder puts it--Hauer-
was has given us much to consider, not the least of which is one more reason to 
doubt those who accuse him of sectarianism. Such charges, which are usually 
coupled with accusations of "withdrawal,'' are so closely bound to spatial meta-
phors that they fail to account for the temporal dimension. In other words, if the 
first thing one wants to say about the distinctiveness of the church is not that it 
inhabits a different "space," but that its life is ordered by a new time, then it 
becomes difficult to see what sense the charge of "withdrawal" makes. If such a 
shift in emphasis is one of Hauerwas's goals, then he has made some important 
headway; however, given such an objective, Hauerwas might have been wise to 
choose a subtitle that didn't appear to trade on the very spatial metaphors he 
wishes to minimize. Furthermore, he might consider giving us more help in see-
ing how the spatial and temporal are connected. One place where he has begun 
to do this well concerns his understanding of hospitality: because Christians live 
with a different relationship to time, they have the freedom to welcome the 
stranger into their "space." We can only hope to see more connections along 
these lines in the future. 
Since it seems unlikely that Hauerwas will quit writing books anytime soon, 
perhaps it may be worth taking a few moments to suggest, rather presumptu· 
ously I suppose, what else we might hope Hauerwas will do in the coming years 
As noted above, Hauerwas seems to be at his best when he combines two differ· 
ent elements: closely reasoned argument and narrative depiction. For example 
Hauerwas is both provocative and stimulating when he takes up a suggestive re 
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mark by someone like Yoder, spells out the "philosophical" arguments entailed 
by Yoder's remark in a more deliberate manner than Yoder either needs or 
cares to do, and interweaves such "abstract" work with a story that provides ma-
terial for theological imagination. Hauerwas has different ways in which he does 
this, sometimes using a story to introduce the issues at stake (such as his discus-
sion with a philosopher about school prayer), sometimes using a narrative to 
frame the whole argument (such as his essay on Thomas More), other times us-
ing the stories more as exemplifications of the more abstract arguments he has 
adduced (such as his use of Olin Teague as an example of practical reasoning 
within a concrete community). What makes these examples so impressive is not 
so much that Hauerwas knows how to do both things at once (although he does 
and many of us probably don't), but that they help us see that both are argu-
ment; that is, that these are merely two necessary moments in any discussion 
that seeks to be illuminative. So, in any future work, we can only hope that Hau-
erwas continues to make the most of this gift. 
As far as enigmas that remain in his work, one general area may be alluded 
to. In the introduction to this collection, Hauerwas suggests that Christians 
should withdraw their support from civic republicanism only when that form of 
government or society resorts to violence to maintain order and external society 
(p. 15). This is a theme that Hauerwas has sounded before. While readers may 
find themselves in agreement with Hauerwas in principle, it remains for him to 
help readers see what resources are available to help "form" people in such a 
way that making such discriminations is possible. Hauerwas would be the first to 
admit that making discriminations about what counts for violence is no easy mat-
ter (and certainly cannot be made in the abstract), but it seems that it is precisely 
at this very difficult juncture that we are left on our own. Furthermore, Hauer-
was has not yet explored the implications for his understanding of violence and 
peace once it is recognized that much of the violence which enslaves us and oth-
ers is what has been called "symbolic violence." What makes such violence so 
pernicious is that it exerts its power without resorting to physical coercion. What 
practices and strategies might Christians engage in to create the space possible 
to live without such violence? 
Similarly, Hauerwas may have to help his readers even more in coming to see 
what kind of community will be necessary for this kind of formation to take 
place. For example, while some readers will no doubt resonate with Hauerwas's 
contention that "at times and in some circumstances Christians will find it im-
possible to participate in government, in aspects of the economy, or in the edu-
cational system" (p. 15), others may find the whole notion of "participation" 
here so vague that their imaginations are stymied when they attempt to consider 
how they might do otherwise. Admittedly, that many of us may find ourselves 
incapable of such imaginative forays is perhaps less a function of Hauerwas's 
;hortcomings and more a reflection of our own captivity to particular habits of 
mind and life, yet such an admission hardly gets Hauerwas off the hook; it simply 
means that he may have to keep arguing what he's been arguing for a long time 
)efore anyone can really hear what he's saying, or more importantly perhaps, be-
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fore anyone will know what to do or be if they discern that what he's been saying 
is true. 
Now, Hauerwas both would and would not want us to take alJ of this (or our-
selves) so seriously. After all, reading books, writing reviews, conversing with our 
friends, sharing a meal, jogging at noon--these are perhaps trivial matters, and 
yet they are of tremendous ethical importance, particularly to the extent that 
they create the time (and peace) necessary for us to live as a redeemed people, 
which may entail nothing less than having the freedom to go on joyfully doing 
things like the above even when it seems like we should be directing all our ener-
gies to more urgent matters. Of course, bringing all of this to your attention 
probably only serves as a reminder; after all, I would expect that readers who 
have endured this article are no doubt already consummate connoisseurs of the 
trivial. 
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Some people's lives seem to defy limitation and definition. They appear on 
the human scene almost magically, mysteriously, and shape whatever they touch 
for generations to come. They become the stuff of heady legends and form a 
kind of happy hunting ground for scholars. Their graves are never cold and si-
lent. History is warmed when such people are benefactors, and chilled when they 
are tyrants. 
Thomas Merton was one of these unique people. He was a Trappist monk--
and a benefactor. Although a member of the Order of Cistercians of the Strict 
Observance (O.C.S.O.), one of Roman Catholicism's strictest orders, he became 
in his lifetime the most widely read monk in the world. That in itself is a contra-
diction and at the heart of Cooper's concern. How is it that a man who desires to 
lose himself in the cloistered life of Our Lady of Gethsemani Monastery, tucked 
away in the central Kentucky knobs and hills, becomes instead an avowed Chris-
tian humanist, addressing himself to issues of modem life in the fast lane? Or, to 
put it in Merton's terms, what motivates a man to move in less than twenty years 
from life in a "cowl" to life in "blue jeans," and that while continuing to profess 
allegiance to the values of contemplative spirituality? It is Cooper's aim to an-
swer these kinds of questions. 
David Cooper has more than a passing interest in Thomas Merton. Currently 
an assistant professor in the Department of American Thought and Language at 
Michigan State University, Cooper is increasingly known as a Merton scholar. In 
addition to this insightful and helpful book on the development of Merton's 
11Dderstanding of self-identity, Cooper is editing the fourth volume in The Letters 
1f Thomas Merton series. (The first two volumes have been released under the 
itles of The Hidden Ground of Love and The Road to Joy.) 
Thomas Merton's Art of Denial is not for those who are reading Merton (Fa-
ber Louis, as he was known in the monastery) for the first time. The book as-
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sumes some knowledge of Merton's life and writing interests. It is for those, like 
myself and Cooper, who have been hooked by Merton and want to know as 
much as possible how the man ticked. There is, I think, an unconscious--if not 
conscious--hope that we will learn something about ourselves in studying the 
spiritual and emotional development of Merton. 
Cooper is not the first writer to pursue this line of investigation into Merton's 
psyche. Several books and monographs have already attempted to shed light on 
the hidden stream of ideas and experiences that shifted Merton from a world-
rejecting monk with an identity crisis to a world-accepting monk with something 
of a unified vision of humanity. The mystery is heightened somewhat by the fact 
that all of this change of attitude and perspective happened while Merton was in 
the monastery, and did not change his fundamental commitment to monastic 
spirituality as one way to God. 
Cooper's area of research is a difficult one. The broad outline of Merton's 
growth as a human "selr' is rather easy to chart, as we will do below. But getting 
to the details of Merton's inner life is a bit more problematic for a couple of rea-
sons. First, there is the sheer volume of printed material available, and the wide 
scope of subjects it handles. How Merton was able to produce so much in so 
short a time is simply a marvel. This becomes even more amazing when we take 
into account that for a very long time Merton was allowed only two, at most 
three, hours a day for writing. Of course, not everything he wrote was of excel-
lent quality, as Merton woefully acknowledged. 
A second problem facing researchers is that the bulk of Merton's unpublished 
writings are off limits, at least for the time being. Merton stipulated that certain 
of his writings not be published until twenty-five years after his death. This 
means, since he died in December, 1968,that these materials will not be released 
until around 1993-94. Notwithstanding, the Merton Legacy Trust, guardian of 
the larger part of the Merton collection, has allowed some publication along the 
way. Still there is a sizeable amount of material to be sifted through. It is not 
unlikely that some new twists and turns may be in the offing. Whether such dis-
coveries will be substantial for Cooper's line of thought is another matter. Nev-
ertheless, the final word is in the future. 
The life of Thomas Merton was anything but dull. A lot of good evenings 
could be spent with Merton's autobiography and journals, or with any one of sev-
eral good biographies that are available. The life that unfolds in these books is 
international in scope, full of insights on human problems and the search for 
God, and laced with humor. If it is true that St. Francis of Assisi loved those 
monks who laughed out loud at prayer, he would have loved Thomas Merton! 
But there was a period when life was more pain than fun for Merton. 
It was as a creative and confused young man that Thomas Merton entered 
Our Lady of Gethsemani Monastery on a winter night in 1941. Trying to escape 
his past and the society that seemed only to increase his loneliness, Merton 
plunged full force into the apophatic spirituality of the Trappists, a cloistered or-
der emphasizing stark simplicity, border-line poverty, total obedience, sacrificial 
chastity, hard work--and silence in solitude. It seemed the perfect place to bury 
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one's self, to die to everything but Christ. At 26, Merton thought he was ready to 
sacrifice everything meaningful to him, literally everything, to attain one su-
preme end: sainthood. What frightened Merton and his friends most is that this 
seemed to bring an abrupt halt to a promising writing career. But Merton's first 
abbot, Frederic Dunne, himself a man of letters, realized the potential of his new 
novice and began to feed Merton's ravenous writing urge. This brought to the 
forefront a terrible tension in Merton. On the one hand, he wanted to be an ob-
scure monk, known only to God. On the other hand, he wanted to be a popular 
and respected writer. It is this tension that Cooper thinks Merton resolved in the 
"missing years." 
Between 1948 (with the publication of his best seller, The Seven Storey Moun-
tain) and 1957, something drastic happened to Merton that changed him totally. 
Merton moved from being a rigid, judgmental, Trappist monk concerned pri-
marily with meditation and the single-minded pursuit of contemplation lo more 
of a free spirit, with a cautious but hopeful view of possibilities for the world, and 
an intense desire to be directly involved in the upheavals of social life worldwide. 
Merton had begun his monastic journey in a very traditional way but surfaced 
later as a leader of monastic renewal--to say the least! 
Cooper, using selective aspects of Erik Erikson's perspective on identity for-
mation, sees the shift in these terms. In his early twenties, Merton's life was 
marked by identity diffusion. This confusion of self-identity can be seen in Mer-
ton's book, My Argument with the Gestapo, written while he was a university stu-
dent but not published until 1969. This identity diffusion revolved around the 
tension created by the desire to display the self and the desire to die to the self. 
It was this man who knocked on the monastery door in the dead of night. 
Merton was well into his sixth year as a monk when his best-selling 
autobiography, The Seven Storey Mountain, was released. He was virtually an 
overnight success. The walls around the monastic enclosure could not keep out 
public interest and the demand for more books. Sudden fame, coupled with 
Merton's preparation for ordination, compounded the tension within him and 
sent him into a state of nervous exhaustion. Seven Storey Mountain showed the 
world a man driven into a radical psychological realignment, according to Coo-
per; that is, an attempted realignment of his sense of self along strict monastic 
lines. The young author was a man fed up with the world and with himself. 
By the time Merton published his sequel to Mountain in 1953, The Sign of 
ronas, Cooper thinks he had moved into a kind of psychosocial moratorium. The 
)ign of Jonas portrays a monk intent on developing an individual piety. Later, in 
cf Thomas Merton Reader, Merton would say that books from his early period 
:eemed to be the ones most preferred by readers. Books like Mountain, Jonas , 
md Seeds of Contemplation (1947) challenged Americans in a booming post-war 
to rethink the impact a growing materialism was having on them. As a 
esult many young men decided to opt for the romance of the monastic life and 
ts inherent denial of worldly values and illusions. Cooper points out that in the 
·ears previous to Jonas, Merton's poetic output dwindled to almost nothing. This 
1as the sign of a real inner struggle in a man who was by nature a poet. Deny 
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who you are: this seemed to be the call of Christ. After all those years Thomas 
Merton had still not resolved the problem--to him--between being a writer, a 
man of the world, and a monk, a man of the Spirit. 
By 1966, with the publication of Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, a new Mer-
ton was solidly in place. The turn was noticeable as early as 1957 when Merton's 
poetic creativity returned with a vengeance. By the late fifties, Merton had be-
come critical of the image he portrayed in Mountain . It was to him a limited, 
truncated, even false view of an ideal monk, too ideal to ever be realized. His 
early monastic identity was seen as a selfish aberration of the real person God 
intended him to become. Love had to be turned outward--toward others. A 
Christian could not be satisfied to be a bystander in the turmoil of the world. 
"The missing years" were dedicated to half a life; the half that was missing was 
the life of the social order. Following Erikson, Cooper thinks with the publica-
tion of Conjectures Merton had reached final identity integration. Merton had 
become a whole man, so to speak. Merton did not jettison the spirituality of his 
early monastic years, rather he refined it, enlarged it, and set it in a social and 
international context. 
What factors led to such a significant change, a change some viewed with hor-
ror, others with relish? Cooper thinks a cluster of influences were involved, some 
internal to Merton and some external. Cooper explores this identity change in 
two parts of his book, each having four chapters. The first, ''The Crisis of the 
Missing Years," highlights Merton's troubled period of the late forties and early 
fifties, and focuses on some of the internal influences exacted on him. During 
this period Merton experienced a continuing tension regarding what he was 
called to become. He also had a deep distrust of the world, reflected in his judg-
mental pronouncements on its values. He seemed to have had a deep need for 
acceptance, especially from a father-figure. These years also show a growing dis-
satisfaction with a highly regimented Cistercian spirituality, which he regarded as 
increasingly restrictive of real spiritual growth. Finally Merton exhibited an al-
most overpowering self-doubt that he could ever become a real monk. "The 
missing years" cast a kind of pall over Merton, although he did have times of 
great joy and a sense of meaning. Clearly though, something would have to 
change. 
There were also external influences, which we see in Cooper's second part of 
the book, "A Radical Humanist and the Radical Critique." Becoming a " radical 
humanist" was Merton's response to his "failed mysticism," according to Coo-
per. The radical humanist is less afraid of the world, though he must at times 
expose its illusions. There is no doubt that this was a period of social concern for 
Merton. He was consumed with issues of war and peace. Some of Merton's most 
pungent remarks were reserved for the war-like mentality he saw operating in 
the world and in the Church. Merton also wrote on matters of race and preju-
dice, of Catholic indifference (as he saw it) to the responsibility to love one's 
enemies. 
Cooper highlights Merton's interest in the then-new generation of Protestant 
theologians. For example, there was Karl Barth with his strong Christology, and 
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Dietrich Bonhoeffer with his "worldly Christianity," a notion that sent shoclc 
waves through the evangelical Church. Merton drew the line with the God-is-
dead theologians, viewing them as dead wrong, an idea shored up for him by the 
Orthodox writer, Alexander Schmemann. Merton's appreciation of Protestant 
writers was augmented by a relaxed mood toward other Christians by Vatican II, 
a move Merton applauded. 
There was also Merton's interest in non-Christian writers, especially Albert 
Camus, on whose work he wrote some critical essays. Merton considered Camus 
the most relevant of the secular writers, though he did not share Camus's pessi-
mism and "acting as if' ethic. Merton was impressed by Eric Fromm and his 
insights into the human condition. Along these same lines, though not given their 
due weight by Cooper, was Merton's revived interest in Zen, especially as pro-
viding a helpful psychology as well as technique for Christian meditation. (This 
point is of significance in my overall evaluation of Cooper's book below.) 
Given Merton's genius and restlessness, it was a foregone conclusion that he 
could never remain fulfilled by a particular system or institution, no matter how 
meaningful in the early going. Merton seemed to always be pushing boundaries, 
even when he said he did not want to do so. His protests against his instincts as a 
writer were in vain. There is no question that Merton entered the monastery to 
become a monk. And there is no question that he changed that to an identifica-
tion as a writer--and a monk. Merton later referred to himself as a "Christian 
1umanist." And this is an important point: the new Merton was more than a 
·adical humanist, be was a "Christian humanist." 
Cooper's finely written and exceedingly helpful book is a major contribution 
o the field of Merton studies. From one perspective, this study of Thomas Mer-
on is also the study of Christianity in the twentieth century. In fact, Merton him-
elf was a change-agent in many ways, and continues to be. Merton regarded the 
ooks he wrote in the late fifties and sixties to be of most value to him, as would 
e expected. However, I suspect his works on meditation and prayer will be of 
ignillcant benefit to many generations of Christians, for it really was Merton's 
1terior life, combined with his inquisitiveness, that sparked the identity changes 
·e see in his relatively short life. There is a bit of irony that Merton, the promi-
::nt Catholic spiritual writer and activist (as much as he could be), and Karl 
arth, the prominent Protestant theologian, whom Merton liked, died the same 
iy. It was a changing of the guard for Western Christendom. 
Cooper has designed an effective book which is easy to read and gives evi-
:nce of deliberate scholarship. The endnotes for each chapter are a bit sparse, 
ven the weighty nature of the subject. The same is true for the general subject 
dex. Although choices have to be made on endnotes and index content, Coo-
r's work is so important that many would like more identification of sources 
d prominent ideas than Cooper supplies. 
Books are written for everyone except editors and reviewers. The rub comes 
that these are among the first to read them. Happy the writer who has con-
nial editors and sympathetic reviewers. That writer will have a long, happy life 
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and many children--or something like that. This reviewer found Cooper's book a 
delight. There are, however, some gaps. 
For example, Cooper is one-sided in his treatment of Merton by viewing the 
development of his self-identity almost exclusively through psychosocial lenses. 
There is no question, of course, that Merton's home life, adolescence and young 
adulthood, fears, struggles with death, and so on, had a profound effect on him 
throughout his life. Psychological and social elements impacting his development 
should not be ignored. However, neither should we ignore God's love and call 
acting on him. Actually it is impossible to talk meaningfully about the develop-
ment of the self, or self-identity, without a Divine/human relationship, that is, if 
one wishes to speak from a Christian posture. 
I am sure it seems easier to chart the development of the psyche according to, 
say, Erikson's psychosocial model or Kohlberg's moral development model. But 
surely God is one of those internal/external influences or change-agents in Mer-
ton's life; Merton would say, the most important. But Cooper seems more at 
home with Erikson, who does indeed have wide acceptance. Nonetheless, I do 
not think Erikson's model carries the weight Copper intends. It seems that 
James Fowler's faith development model, relatively close to Erikson, is better 
suited for an interpretation of Merton's changing view of the self (cf. Stages of 
Faith). 
Utilizing Fowler's model, beginning with "synthetic-conventional faith," a 
stage usually entered in adolescence but retained in "most" Christian adults, we 
are able to see how Merton begins his monastic career with the desire to attain a 
great fidelity by conforming to the expectations of others. The monastic commu-
nity at Gethsemani, steeped in tradition in 1941, would have reinforced the sup-
posed security of this stage of spiritual development; indeed, the pre-Vatican II 
understanding of "the Church" tended to do the same thing. The self, then, is a 
rather conventional self, requiring little or no critique of the system from which 
it draws its identity. This certainly seems to be the mind-set of the Merton of the 
early forties. 
It is safe to say that Merton was moving back and forth between "synthetic-
conventional faith" and Fowler's next stage, "individuative-reflective faith." Mer-
ton gradually accepted, albeit uneasily, the responsibilities of his actions in mov-
ing into a monastic vocation. He accepted, for the most part, the deeper mean-
ing implied by his decision to seek God in the closed environment of Gethse-
mani. Certainly Merton's creative and curious mind caused him lo go behind the 
symbols of life and faith, and that rather early. He was rarely, if ever, comfort-
able with the surface level of things, even in nature. He preferred essence to ap-
pearance. If, as Fowler suggests, entrance into this stage is usually triggered by 
an inner restlessness, a disturbing sense of reality, then there were many occa-
sions in Merton's novice period to push him beyond systems and rules. 
"Conjunctive faith," Fowler's next stage, is very high indeed. At this stage per· 
sons are willing, even eager, to dialogue with other faith-systems, to look fo1 
truth wherever it is found. By 1957, Merton was exploring other understanding: 
of reality as fast as he could. He saw a need to integrate conscious and subcon 
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scious forces in his life, partially in a new view of others "as others," as "thous" 
rather than "its" (to borrow from Buber, whom Merton respected). The moti-
vating concerns of this stage, according to Fowler, are reflected in the need to 
see life in relation to universal love and justice. This, in part, could account for 
Merton's radical investment of energy in social matters as he approached mid 
life. 
The last stage for Fowler is "universalizing faith." This is seeing life as the big 
picture, from the standpoint of a person absorbed with love and justice. The pri-
vate self is given over to the concerns of the larger whole. This is "golden rule" 
living and "loving God with all you are and your neighbor as yourself," and that 
with little or no hesitation or defensiveness. This is the counterpoint to a judg-
mental spirit, operating as it does from empathy for others. Everything we know 
about the mature Merton points to this universalizing faith as the major charac-
teristic of his life in the mid sixties. This stage is not a static perfectionism, but a 
genuine living out of self-giving. It is marked by a certain unseen joy. It is, as 
Merton would say, a gift of the Spirit. 
I think Fowler integrates the best of Erikson with his own system. I really do 
not want to contend for a system as such, but I would hope that whatever system 
or theory we use to understand Merton's search for self-identity would incorpo-
rate both the psychosocial and the spiritual. Benedict Groschel and Gerald May, 
recognized authorities in the field of self-identity and spirituality, have also tried 
to do this. Of course, God is not bound by any system, as we see so clearly in the 
"fools for Christ" of the Orthodox tradition. 
My concerns above relate to another, similar matter. The "radical" character 
of Merton's "humanism" was that it was radically Christian. He called himself a 
Christian humanist. This is to say that Merton would not have become a secular 
humanist. His Christology would not have permitted this. Cooper does say Mer-
ton's humanism was essentially Christian, but does not, in my opinion, say it 
loudly enough. Based on his views on war and peace, his taped conferences of 
the mid sixties, and his declining interest in speaking forcefully on social issues, 
Merton was constitutionally unable to have ever become a gun-toting "Chris-
tian" revolutionary in the third world. The radical nature of the self, as Merton 
saw it, lies in its relationship with the radical love of Christ, a love that gives, 
absorbs, blesses, forgives and dies. 
In one place Cooper unaccountably errs. It is with Merton's growing interest 
in Zen. I think a case can be made that the Merton of the mid to late sixties was 
returning to a renewed interest in meditation and prayer, and that this pursuit 
was largely sparked by his fascination with Zen Buddhism. This has been a tick-
lish point for some people, even to the extent of thinking Merton was in the 
process, before he died, of leaving Gethsemani to become a Buddhist monk. It is 
difficult to put that unfounded rumor to rest, but it should be. Merton thought 
Zen had important psychological contributions to make to the Christian under-
standing of the self and its relationship with God through meditation. The "Bud-
dha nature," for Merton, was in many ways akin to the Christian notion of self-
denial, though it was lacking an essential Christology. And if one wants to talk 
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about integration in Merton's view of the self, how can his experience at Polon-
naruwa be bypassed? 
I am presently convinced that had Merton lived he would have written some 
of his best work on meditation and prayer. It is unfortunate that we will never 
know. My point is that Merton's eastern trip helped prepare him to take his 
readers into different chambers of the Divine mind. Upon reflection, perhaps it 
is best we do not have these insights. Perhaps it is to our advantage that Merton 
left us with only a rather full outline of the spiritual journey, leaving it to us to 
take it and make our own discoveries of God and self. 
There are yet other paths in Thomas Merton's Art of Denial I would like to 
explore. I wish Merton's spiritual sources had been able to rear their heads more 
often; such as the desert fathers, John Cassian, Bernard of Clairvaux, to name a 
few. I think Zen and the Birds of Appetite, Merton's last book before his death, 
deserves a place in Cooper's concern with the development of self-identity. I 
would liked to have compared Anne E. Carr's book, A Search for Wisdom and 
Spirit, with Art of Denial. Carr's book may well be the better balanced of the two 
on Merton's view of the self. 
Having said all that, I want to close with a restatement of my earlier apprecia-
tion of Cooper's work. In this book he has certainly established himself as a 
scholar who must be reckoned with whenever serious study is given to Thomas 
Merton. In the final analysis, a good book is one that energizes people to discuss 
things that really matter, and Cooper's book does that. 
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James R. Goff, Jr. Fields White Unto Harvest: Charles F. Parham and the 
Missionary Origins of Pentecostalism. Fayetteville, London: University of 
Arkansas Press, 1988. ix, 262 pps. ISBN 1-55728-025-8. 
The history of Pentecostalism has been the subject of numerous analyses. 
However, while there has been considerable debate about the origins of the Pen-
tecostal Movement, most have been as much determined by the concerns of the 
individual author as by the facts. Assemblies of God scholars (Menzies, 
Blumhofer) have endeavored to minimize the relationships between early lead-
ers and theologians of Pentecostalism and the Wesleyan/ Holiness tradition. 
Scholars from the Pentecostal Holiness (Synan) and Church of God (Cleveland) 
{Conn) churches have tended to simplify a complex set of structures. Secular his-
torians {Anderson), have noticed the relationship but have not reflected on its 
significance. Others (D. Nelson, I. McRoberts), following Walter Hollenweger, 
have attempted to deny the historical and theological relationships between the 
two religious traditions locating the origins of Pentecostal theology, liturgy and 
social vision in "slave religion." The careful historical analysis of Goff, the first 
non-ideological historical analysis of the origins of Pentecostalism, provides a 
definitive refutation of the Hollenweger theory and carefully nuances all other 
earlier historical constructions. 
The material for this work is the life and context of Charles Parham (1873-
1929), the Wesleyan/ Holiness evangelist/theologian who worked out the theo-
retical structures for the early Pentecostal movement and developed its early or-
ganizational patterns. Goff traces the life of Parham from the early days in Kan-
;as where he served as a minister in the Methodist Episcopal Church, before be-
:oming involved with the Holiness movement after an experience of physical 
iealing. He withdrew from the Methodist Church and began a healing ministry. 
fhis was moved to Topeka as the Beth-el Healing Home. This eventually ex-
>anded to include a Bible Institute, a temporary orphanage service and an em-
>loyment office. A periodical, The Apostolic Faith (which would become an in-
emational standard name for Pentecostal periodicals), advertised the meetings 
llld served to link the expanding groups of "Apostolic Faith" believers. Parham 
ontinued to be influenced by the writings of A. J. Gordon and Charles Cullis. 
fowever, most important for his development were Alexander Dowie and Frank 
anford. He visited their centers to observe and to attempt to inject himself into 
\Je leadership of their centers with the undisguised intention of taking control. 
'rom 1902-1906 Parham established the "Apostolic Faith" throughout the 
outh, moving his headquarters to Houston. He made provision for William Sey-
1our to go to California as evangelist, where he was invited to pastor the small 
1ission at which American religious history would soon be changed. Parham 
•entually went to California in an effort to establish "Apostolic Faith" control 
ver the mission. Under attack in the Midwest by his competitor at Zion, Illinois, 
r. G. Voliva, who charged him with homosexuality, Parham was unable to es-
.blish himself in Los Angeles and was expelled from the Azusa Street mission. 
off examines all the evidence and interviewed acquaintances of Parham and 
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concludes that the information available is insufficient either to implicate or ex-
onerate Parham of the charges. 
The Pentecostal movement expanded rapidly, but Parham was unable to re-
tain his position in the leadership of the larger movement after the struggle with 
Voliva. The organization he founded continued to survive, albeit in the shadow 
of the larger churches organized after 1906. He moved his headquarters to 
Baxter Springs, Arkansas, from where he continued his evangelistic ministry in 
comparative obscurity. 
Goff documents each development and controversy with careful detail. He 
chronicles the theological and ecclesiological developments in Parham's thought 
throughout the transition from Wesleyan/Holiness to Pentecostal theologian. 
One is struck by the fact that all of the theoretical structures for the appearance 
of what would be considered a "distinctly Pentecostal" perspective were in place 
several years before Azusa Street. Even more apparent from Gofrs narrative is 
the nationwide network of evangelist/theologians and institutions which were 
moving together toward a consensus for which Parham was a foremost theoreti-
cian. It was he who concluded that "glossolalia" was the initial evidence of the 
Baptism of the Holy Spirit, that "Spirit-filled believers [are] the 'sealed' Bride of 
Christ," and that "xenoglossic tongues [were] the tool for a dramatic endtime re-
vival" (p. 173). Each of these ideas had had its adherents in the Wesleyan/ Holi-
ness tradition for more than a decade. Parham's contribution was to fuse the 
three. 
Goff has assembled and analyzed with magisterial care all known data about 
Charles Parham, including never-before-used periodical literature produced by 
the Holiness and Pentecostal movements between 1890 and 1929. There are un-
answered questions. The information about the scandals which caused Parham's 
downfall is incomplete and does not provide an adequate base for arriving at 
conclusions. It is also impossible to describe with bibliographic precision the 
various influences on Parham's thought. Additional research in Wesleyan/ Holi-
ness periodical literature will be necessary before the milieu of Parham's think-
ing can be established and the various trajectories of Wesleyan/Holiness thought 
described. Additional scholarly analyses are needed for other key players of the 
period including the racist W. Faye Carothers, Black evangelist William Sey-
mour and Dowie follower W. G. Voliva. Similar studies are necessary for theolo-
gians in competition with the early Pentecostals, such as P. Breese, H. C. Morri-
son, William Sherman, A. B. Simpson and Seth Rees who did not join the new 
movement. These are all dissertation topics in their own right, so to suggest that 
they are important desiderata is not to take away from Gofrs achievement. He 
has provided a benchmark against which other efforts will be judged. 
DAVID BUNDY 
Associate Professor of Christian Origins 
Collection Development Librarian 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
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William R. Hutchison, E"and to the World: American Protestant Thought and 
Foreign Missions. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
xii, 227 pp. ISBN 0226363090 
Christian mission has been a constant factor of the American experience. The 
New England Puritans came to understand their mission, their "errand to the 
wilderness," as creating a new order of protective and nurturing environment for 
the Church through the reorganization of the North American continent as was 
their Christian duty. Their hope was to provide a model for the spirituality of the 
European nations. Through the various periods of American history, the concept 
of mission and the target audiences have changed. Enthusiasm for the project, 
variously defined, has remained high. Despite the thousands of persons who 
"went" and the millions who supported the undertaking financially, little effort 
has been made to examine American mission thought using scholarly tools of 
analysis. Hutchison's is a pioneering effort. 
The method of the volume is to focus on the interaction between the mission 
theory, the structure of the ideas and the main themes of American cultural de-
velopment. These themes include the varying degrees of national isolationism 
and internationalism, the "Christ and culture" balance in the United States, the 
development of American national identity and the developing awareness and 
of the larger world. Special attention is given to the problem of defining 
:he goal of Christian mission: Is the mission to civilize (that is promote Ameri-
::an standards of social interaction, health, economics, and so on) or is it to 
'evangelize"? 
Hutchison begins with the Puritans and Roman Catholic missions to the Na-
ive Americans. The mission efforts coincided with the development of Euro-
.ean colonial structures and their success was usually directly related to the co-
1peration of colonial rulers. Others, such as Roger Williams and the Quakers, 
ttempted to see the "image of God" in the Native Americans and found them 
enerally to be less "sinful" than the Europeans! Eschatological analysis pro-
ided a rationalization for the lack of success: the conversion of the nations was 
ot expected before the fall of the "Antichrist." It was Cotton Mather who pro-
ided the ideological basis for subsequent efforts. He asserted that America was 
new land where "true and original Christianity" was developing. 
The early national period saw small beginnings enveloped with expansive tri-
mphalistic rhetoric as mission organizations used biblical, humanitarian and na-
:malist rationales to encourage contributions. The American Board of Commis-
oners of Foreign Mission {ABCFM) was founded in 1810 and remained the 
·emier sending agency for more than half a century. It was centered in New 
ngland and drew deeply from the Puritan ethos. The same was true of most of 
e other numerically significant agencies including the Northern Baptists, Pres-
terians and Methodists. Strategists of the period include Samuel Worcester, 
muel Hopkins, E. D. Griffin and Hiram Bingham. The most important, bow-
er, was Rufus Anderson {ABCFM), "the outstanding American organizer and 
!orist of foreign missions in the nineteenth century'' (p. 78). Anderson insisted 
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that Christian religion and civilization will triumph and that cultural structures 
are not to be imposed since the Holy Spirit uses the exposition of the gospel to 
develop a thoroughly Christian civilization. He insisted that education and evan-
gelism be done in the vernacular and that all non-evangelistic structures that had 
become part of the ABCFM program be discontinued. He was able to promote 
this understanding during more than forty years as secretary of the ABCFM. 
The reaction to Anderson was strong. The new language of mission, parallel-
ing the American national experience, became one of imperialism, as expressed 
in Robert Speer's comment: "There is a false imperialism which is abhorrent to 
Christianity, and there is a true imperialism which is inherent in it." Evangelism 
became a more inclusive term, incorporating all of the social programs Ander-
son had attempted to suppress. The new leaders were John R. Mott, Sherwood 
Eddy, Robert E. Speer, James Dennis and A. T. Pierson. In a context marked by 
the fundamentalist-modernist controversy and the 1893 Congress on World Re-
ligions, both the liberals and evangelicals shared a common vision of the superi-
ority of Christianity and a commitment to social ministry. 
The central theme of mission theory for the twentieth century has been the 
dialectic first articulated by Anderson which each successive organization and 
missiologist has since been forced to address: evangelism vs. social ministry. 
Hutchison documents the shifts in both "Liberal" and "evangelical" circles, ex-
amining especially Gustav Warneck, Heinrich Frick, W. H. Griffith Thomas, 
Robert Speer, W. E. Hocking, D. J. Fleming, R. C. Hutchison, Pearl Buck, J. G . 
Machen, D. McGavran, H. Kraemer, J. Hoekendijk, J. R. Stott and L. Newbigin. 
As the discussion has continued, and as groups of "evangelicals" have legiti-
mized social ministry, albeit on a different ideological basis than the " liberals," 
new independent organizations have grown up on the " right" to provide signifi-
cant personal and financial resources for "evangelistic missions." 
Hutchison's analysis of the development of mission theory is a magisterial ef-
fort that will serve as a necessary starting point for future work. He makes no 
effort to oversimplify complex data, motivations and relationships. He fairly 
states positions from all sides of the various ideological divides. He also indicates 
an awareness of material not included in the analysis, especially Wesleyan/ Holi-
ness and Pentecostal mission efforts of the late nineteenth and twentieth centu-
nes. 
The author makes no pretension of exhaustive analysis, and so to suggest ar-
eas which, if considered, might have resulted in a different portrait is not to de-
tract from the significance of Hutchison's work. The greatest problem of the 
book is its focus on the "mainline" theorists. "Non-mainline" influences are 
interpreted only in light of the "mainline" or as reactions to that structure before 
1960. The class or social location issue, which is of major import for the study of 
American missions, does not enter the discussion. For example, the friction be-
tween the Methodist Mission Board and the Holiness advocates who supplied 
many of the Methodist missionaries between 1870 and 1920 can be best under-
stood in such terms. The key theorists for this period are William Taylor and 
Andrew Murray. Taylor, in turn, influenced Vivian Dake, William Sherman 
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Anna Abrams and Hiram Reynolds. E. Stanley Jones and J. Wascom Pickett 
contributed to a redefinition of mission practice which paved the way for post-
Colonial Christianity in Asia. Europeans such as Karl Hoekendijk, T. B. Barratt, 
A. P. Franklin and Fred Squire provided the missiological theory which has 
made Pentecostalism the third largest Christian communion. 
The interaction between Americans and Europeans between 1870 and 1900, 
especially the "higher life" Holiness Americans (W. Boardman, R. P. and H. W. 
Smith, D. L. Moody) and the conservative wing of the Evangelical Alliance (Het 
Reveil. Le Reveil, Basel Mission), deserves attention as a major mission pro-
gram directed at the European continent with motives and theoretical structures 
not unlike those of the early Puritans. The particular convergence of American 
Wesleyan/Holiness ideology with Anglican Broad Church and Continental Pie-
tism has been underrated in its influence on the mission theory of the twentieth 
century. 
Another issue which merits research is the genre in which missiological re-
flection is presented. All of the theoreticians discussed by Hutchison spoke and 
wrote in genre and intellectual categories with which the academic world is com-
fortable. A more inclusive approach would require the analysis of missionary 
hagiography /history, testimonies, sermons and periodical literature as well as 
different sending and funding patterns. 
These and other lacunae indicate that the history of Christian mission theory 
is a discipline still in its earliest stages. Hutchison has made a monumental con-
tribution to the field, supplementing the work of Ralph Gabriel, Perry Miller 
and Sidney Ahlstrom. 
DAVID BUNDY 
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Kung, Hans. Theology for the Third Millennium: An Ecumenical View. 
New York: Doubleday, 1988. 284 pp. Index. ISBN 0385244983 
For those scholars who have tried repeatedly to understand the arcane world 
of postmodern criticism, Kung's most recent work, Theology for the Third Millen-
nium: An Ecumenical View, is something of a boon. This German theologian's 
style--unlike some of his compatriots--is remarkably lucid, and his basic argu-
ment is both orderly and well developed. Jn a real sense, the work breathes the 
atmosphere of a mature theologian who has scaled the heights of the contempo-
rary theological world, who can see both its problems and its possibilities, and 
who is in earnest to communicate this wider perspective. 
Ostensibly, the aim of the book is to help religion perform an up-to-date criti-
cal and liberating role for both the individual and society. This task, as important 
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as it is, cannot be accomplished, argues Kung, until "theology has resolved the 
classical conflicts that have been backed up since the Reformation" (p. 11). In 
other words, there must be dialogue, understanding and tolerance within the 
Christian household before the wider, global, perspective of the world religions 
can be seriously entertained. 
But it is precisely this area of classical conflicts in terms of inter-faith dialogue 
that will, no doubt, prove to be troublesome for both Catholic and Protestant 
readers alike. Kung's resolution of the theological conflicts of the Reformation 
era, for example, is much too facile. Erasmus--Kung's choice for a mediator be-
tween authoritarian Rome and the aggressive Luther--is idealized in a way that 
bears little relation to the historical record. Along these lines, the author repeat-
edly plays a game of "what if." What might have happened if Erasmus bad come 
forward with clear suggestions for practical solutions, and so on (p. 38). But the 
point is that Erasmus didn't, and what's more, be wouldn't have been Erasmus if 
he had. Spinning out a wish list, as Kung does, neither alters the historical rec-
ord, nor does it really prepare the way for future dialogue. 
The author is much more effective, however--and some would say more real-
istic--when he underscores the misery of contemporary dogmatic theology in 
general (Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant) and when he calls for the corrective 
of historical critical exegesis (p. 85) as the only sound basis for theology in the 
future. Theology, according to Kung, must become as historically attentive as the 
field of biblical studies already is. Undoubtedly, such an approach will hardly be 
appreciated by either traditionalists or neo-scholastics, but it could, if employed 
properly, clear away some of the more perplexing issues that have heretofore di-
vided the churches, especially in terms of the doctrine of the sacraments and 
church polity. 
Beyond classical conflicts, the major argument of the book is concerned with 
the development of future perspectives. Indeed, for this Tubingen scholar, the 
heart of the theological endeavor in these postmodern times is the balancing of 
the norm of Christian theology, that is, revelation, with the horizon of Christian 
theology which is none other than our own human world of experience--a world 
that has become remarkably diverse and complex as of late. Aided by the semi-
nal work of Kuhn and Toulmin, Kung maintains that the paradigm of modernity 
no longer works very well, theologically or otherwise, since it has been success-
fully criticized in a number of ways. First of all, science, technology and industri-
alism have all become profoundly questionable for postmoderns, and the watch-
words of the Enlightenment such as reason, nature and progress no longer func-
tion in the same easy and assuring way. Kung is quick to add however--lest he be 
seen as giving support to reactionaries--that the postmodern critique on the En-
lightenment does not constitute its rejection, but instead its critical acceptance, 
what the Catholic scholar in one place refers to as "an Enlightenment that is en-
lightened" (p. 199). 
Second, the social, cultural, political and religious myopia of the West has in-
creasingly been called into question by a third world that demands to be heard. 
Polycentrism, therefore, must replace Western hegemony, and the areas of eco-
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nomic exploitation, racism and sexism offer, in the words of Kung, "the central 
challenge in our century for theology, the Church and society'' (p. 175). This 
means, of course, that the context in which theology needs to be done has grown 
considerably. In light of this, what the author advocates is a "critical ecumenical 
theology," a phrase that in a real sense summarizes the entire argument of the 
book. Theology must become critical in that it should be historically rather than 
traditionally based, and it must become ecumenical in that it should operate 
against the widest possible backdrop. 
The problems that ensue as one attempts this latter project--that is, construct-
ing Christian theology in light of the other major religions of the world--domi-
nates the remainder of the argument. Yes, the Tubingen scholar does raise and 
answer the question, "Is there one true religion?"--an answer that, by the way, 
will not make conservatives very happy--but the major contribution of this sec-
tion lies elsewhere. Interestingly enough, Kung has developed an objective basis 
to judge the truth of any given religi<;>n with respect to three principal criteria: 
ethical, religious and Christian. If, for example, a religion spreads inhumanity by 
hindering the development of human beings or by violating their basic rights, 
then according to the general ethical criterion just listed, one has a basis for call-
ing this religion both false and bad. Religious practices, in other words, do not 
have to be tolerated simply because they are religious, and this reviewer, at least, 
has little doubt as to how Kung would decide the recent Salman Rushdie affair. 
In sum, the style of Theology for the Third Millennium, its eminent readability, 
the flow of its argument, and the seriousness and importance of the subject un-
der review all suggest a serious and thoughtful reading by both scholar and lay-
person. Clearly, Kung has written what should prove to be an appropriate guide 
to the future of the Church as it addresses some of its very real problems, and as 
it prepares to speak a relevant word to the people of the twenty-first century. 
KENNETH J. COLLINS 
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Fox. Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 
1987, 344 pp., $10.95, ISBN 0-06-250343-X. 
I have rarely been so captivated and, indeed, moved by a biography as I was 
1y this one. I found myself being carried along by the greatness of a man who 
vas portrayed in a masterfully written text, and I knew that I was looking at both 
as well as twentieth-century politics, culture and theology through new 
ierspectives and insights. The perplexities of human relationships, of political af-
iliations and of theological categories were dealt with from all sides, as it were, 
nd the book was a veritable kaleidoscope of those complexities. 
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Nevertheless, constantly standing out from the pages was Niebuhr himself as 
both a man of his time and one who shaped his time. He was portrayed as a 
public man, antagonist, friend, colleague, preacher, teacher and devoted son, 
brother, husband and father. In reading this book one understands Niebuhr's 
spiritual faith and commitment, and also his political realism. The reader also 
relates Niebuhr, perhaps for the first time in a comprehensive way, to his family 
background and to his own family loyalties, and to a life which was lived at a 
frantic pace. Indeed, one gets out of breath as he or she observes Niebuhr mean-
ingfully participating in his often turbulent lif e--studying, writing, lecturing, 
preaching, travelling. And the pictures in the book well illuminate the life of this 
public man. 
There was grandeur in the life which Niebuhr lived, and that comes across 
through Fox's excellently-crafted work. There was greatness in the compelling 
figure of Niebuhr, and this also is revealed through the narrative. This biography 
is a worthy contribution not only to our understanding of a commanding person-
ality, but also to our insight into the history of the century which we share with 
Niebuhr--theological, political, economic and cultural history. 
Most intriguing to me was the full picture of Niebuhr: his sense of humor, his 
delight in a good argument, his foibles and curious mannerisms. My appreciation 
for Niebuhr was augmented as the author portrayed Niebuhr's own unashamed 
sense of morality. Fox revealed that Niebuhr's disagreements with Tillich were 
not merely intellectual, but personal as well. He could not forgive Tillich's sexual 
escapades. Likewise, his doubts about John F. Kennedy were not only about 
Kennedy's politics or lack of intellectual depth. They were also about Kennedy's 
personal morality--or lack of it. "For all Niebuhr's realism," Fox writes, "he was 
still the residual 'Protestant purist,' as he confessed to Frankfurter, who could 
not tolerate a purely amoral public arena. He of course could not endure pure 
Protestant moralism either. As usual he was in-between, insisting on the 'moral 
ambiguity' of politics" (p. 272). 
One of Fox's best contributions to the study of Niebuhr is this--in order to 
give us a complete picture of Niebuhr, Fox does an excellent job of weaving 
Niebuhr's major works throughout the biography by introducing them into the 
proper chronological context. The author also gives an exposition of these works, 
and so the reader sees the background of Niebuhr's writings, and Fox's explana-
tions help to illuminate them. Criticisms of Niebuhr's thinking are important, 
and are not to be overlooked by the admiration one has for this book. However, 
prior to such evaluations must come a comprehension both of Niebuhr and the 
context for his thinking and writing. Fox does that for us, and does it with con-
summate skill. 
This book, finally, is a tribute to two people--Niebuhr and Fox. A great serv-
ice has been rendered to the theological and intellectual history of the twentieth 
century, and to a lasting understanding of Niebuhr. Fox summarizes the essence 
of this biography with the final sentence in the Afterward: 
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Responsibility, long-term commitment, fidelity to family, devotion to the 
interests of future generations, willingness to admit one's faults, 
readiness to accept one's limits: in themselves these are neither 
conservative, liberal, nor radical notions. But they are an indispensable 
foundation for any lasting cultural or political vision (p. 336). 
ROGER J. GREEN 
Professor of Biblical and Theological Studies 
Gordon College 
Donald D. McKim, ed. How Karl Barth Changed My Mind. Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1986. 186 pp. $9.95. ISBN 0-8028-0099-8. 
This book was written as a tribute to Karl Barth on the hundredth anniversary 
of his birth. Although written for a specific occasion, it is nevertheless timeless in 
that it provides insight into the impact of this seminal theologian upon both the 
thinking and the lives of various people who are themselves significant men and 
women in the theological landscape today. 
How Karl Barth Changed My Mind is a series of essays, most of them written 
specifically for this tribute, by people of various theological and ecclesiastical tra-
ditions, but who share the common experience of having been influenced--as we 
all have in the twentieth century--by Karl Barth. As with any work of this kind, 
the essays are of uneven length and quality. There are some very simple but 
moving tributes to Barth, and there are some essays which reopen some of those 
issues which were critical to Barth himself. A couple of the essays wander into 
the writers' own theological musings and thereby miss the point of the intention 
of this book. But most writers are on target in remembering that this book was 
intended not as a tribute to themselves, but to their teacher and mentor. 
It is, naturally, impossible to assess each of the essays. Each reader will have 
to do that for himself or herself. However, two great impressions came to me as 
I read the book. First, there were reminders throughout of those issues which 
were so important to Barth--the centrality of Christ as Lord, the nature of the 
Church, the Christian concern for justice, or the life of obedience for the Chris-
tian. These kinds of emphases, forthrightly stated and lived out by Barth, influ-
enced so many of the writers, whether their minds were changed, shaped or con-
firmed by these theological convictions. Were one teaching a seminar on Barth, I 
believe that this book might serve as either an introduction to the seminar, or as 
a fitting conclusion, so that the students might model the writers and reflect criti-
cally on how Barth may have influenced them. 
Second, I was often both humored and moved by the personal stories and in-
sights into the man, the person, the individual known as Karl Barth. Many had 
the privilege of knowing Barth personally and studying with him, and their anec-
92 Book Reviews 
dotes of this unassuming and gentle scholar are fascinating, especially for those 
of us who were not so privileged. One example from one of the best essays will 
suffice: after stating that "A rumpled, lovable, old giant of learning, Barth acted 
toward us as a pastor," Elizabeth Achtemeier wrote, 
I mention these things because it seems to me that part of the test of 
any theological system is the evidence of the working of that theology in 
the life of its author. Does that which is being propounded bear the 
scriptural fruit of the Spirit in the life of the propounder? Some of the 
leading theologians of the twentieth century fail that test, but Karl Barth 
did not. The faith he taught produced in him love, joy, peace, kindness, 
gentleness, self-control. He lived by what he believed and the life he 
lived, he lived to Christ. Perhaps that personal witness has meant more 
to me than anything else (pp. 108-lo<J). 
Such a well-crafted tribute hit at the core of what much of this book meant to 
me. How Karl Barth Changed My Mind provides not only theological perceptions, 
but both spiritual and personal insights as well, which makes the reading of 
Barth all the more of an enriching experience for me. 
Here is a book and a tribute well worth the reading. It is beyond all doubt that 
any who take the theological enterprise seriously have in some measure been in-
fluenced by Barth. And the variety of perceptions in this work practically guaran-
tees that every reader will both learn and, at times, resonate with the expressions 
written therein. 
ROGER J. GREEN 
Professor of Biblical and Theological Studies 
Gordon College 
Richard E. Friedman and H. G. M. Williamson, editors. The Future of Biblical 
Studies: The Hebrew Scripture. SBL Semeia Studies. Atlanta, Georgia: 
Scholars Press, 1987. 2£J7 pp. $13.95, paper. ISBN 1555400981. 
Friedman and Williamson have provided us with a book that largely describes 
the nature of the methodologies that are in vogue among scholars of the Hebrew 
Scriptures to mine the riches of this ancient corpus of texts. 
In general, the book highlights the common phenomenon that is now found in 
the field of research in the Hebrew Scriptures: a conscious concern, critique and 
awareness of the methods that are current over against the time-honored histori-
cal critical approach that has reigned since Wellhausen. However, in addition to 
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the concern for method, there is a wide-spread recognition that a multi-discipli-
nary approach, including a good spirit of cooperation among scholars, is func-
tioning. Sociological, anthropological and literary criticism of a new kind are the 
leading elements in current study, along witb a resulting new historiography. 
Within these disciplines a subset of women's studies has arisen that is making 
some headway in reading the Hebrew Scriptures from a feminist perspective. 
The book is quite even in the quality of its chapters. It includes chapters by 
Robert A. Oden, Jr. ("Intellectual History and the Study of the Bible"), Jon D. 
Levensen ("Tbe Hebrew Bible, The Old Testament, and Historical Criticism"), 
Alan Cooper ("On Reading the Bible Critically and Otherwise"), Richard Elliott 
Freidmann ("The Recession of Bible Source Criticism"), Baruch Halpern ("Bib-
lical or Israelite History"), Jo Ann Hackett ("Women's Studies and the Hebrew 
Bible"), Tomoo Ishida ("Adonijah The Son of Haggith and His Supporters: An 
Inquiry into Problems About History and Historiography'') and H. G. M . Wil-
liamson ("Post-Exilic Historiography''). In all of these articles, the assessment of 
literary genre and hence the motive and purpose of the literature, is paramount 
for interpretation of the text. The use of sociological, anthropological method-
ologies is used to buttress the analysis of literary genre more or less, according 
to each contributor. The future of biblical studies is projected on the basis of the 
current practices. The book is an excellent entree into current methodologies in 
the study of the Old Testament. 
EUGENEE.CARPENTER 
Professor of Old Testament/Hebrew 
Bethel College 
Crimm, Keith, Roger A. Bullard and Larry D. Shinn, eds. Perennial Dictionary of 
World Religions. New York: Harper and Row, 1989 (1981). xviii, 830 pp. 
$22.95, paper. ISBN: 0-06-061613-x. 
This useful dictionary represents a paperback reissue, unrevised, of the Abing-
ton Dictionary of Living Religions, published in 1981. The contributors, generally 
l.Dlong the most able interpreters of their subject matters, treat their topics as 
lSpects of living religious traditions. That is, not only are doctrines, beliefs and 
tistorical matters considered, but also the cultural phenomena associated with 
he religious traditions. Although the entries are alphabetically arranged by sub-
!d, the user is guided to the articles in the volume which relate to the major 
mrld religions, the several regional traditions (e.g., African Traditional Reli-
ion) and the very useful articles that deal with phenomena that cross the lines 
.f religious traditions (e.g., eschatology, founders, pilgrimage and sacrifice). 
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Since this dictionary remains the best single-volume reference tool in its field, its 
reappearance in this relatively inexpensive edition is a boon to all who study 
world religions seriously. 
A.H. MATHIAS ZAHNISER 
John Wesley Beeson Professor of World Missions 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Religious Traditions of the World Series 
Denny, Frederick. ls/am. New York: Harper and Row, 1988. ix, 140 pp. $7.95, 
paper. ISBN 0-06-06521-x 
Earhart, H. Byron. Religions of Japan . New York: Harper and Row, 1984. 
ix, 142 pp. $7.95, paper. ISBN 0-06-062112-5. 
Fishbane, Michael. Judaism: Revelation and Traditions. New York: Harper and 
Row, 1987. xi, 144 pp. $7.95, paper. ISBN 0-06-062655-0. 
Frankiel, Sandra S. Christianity: A Way of Salvation. New York: Harper and 
Row, 1985. viii, 135 pp. $8.95, paper. ISBN 0-06-063015-9. 
Hultkrantz, Ake. Native Religions of North America. New York: Harper 
and Row, 1988. ix, 144 pp. $7.95, paper. ISBN 0-06-064061-8. 
Knipe, David M. Hinduism. New York: Harper and Row (projected for 
1991). 
Lawson, E. Thomas. Religions of Africa. New York: Harper and Row, 1985. 
ix, 106 pp. $9.95, paper. ISBN 0-06-065211-x. 
Lester, Robert C. Buddhism: The Path to Nirvana. New York: Harper and 
Row, 1987. ix, 144 pp. $8.95, paper. ISBN 0-06-065243-8. 
Overmyer, Daniel L. Religions of China: The World as a Living System. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1986. ix, 125 pp. $8.95, paper. ISBN 0-06-066401-0 
This series of inexpensive paperback volumes on the religious traditions of 
the world represents an excellent resource for learning about world religions as 
historical and cultural traditions. Readers of these volumes learn about world 
faiths as they express themselves in the lives of people in community. The books 
are written from the point of view of the modern study of religion that prevails in 
the universities of North America, which attempts to treat the various religions 
fairly and accurately. Readers gain an insight into religions as they manifest 
themselves in time and space and not as their adherents or critics would like to 
present them. These authors tend to accentuate the positive dimensions of these 
traditions. 
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Because their authors are largely successful in presenting their subject mat-
ters fairly and positively, these books are especially useful for study in the 
churches and by Christians in colleges and universities. I know of no set of inex-
pensive books which succeeds so well at helping Christians understand why these 
non-Christian religious traditions are so attractive to so many of the people in-
fluenced by them. If we underestimate the attraction of these faiths to their ad-
herents, or interpret it as enslavement to demonic and evil powers, we wiJI be 
unprepared to give an effective witness to these people for our Lord. 
If the books for sale in a typical evangelical bookstore are any indicator, evan-
gelicals currently do not have much interest in understanding other people and 
their cultures and values. This is lamentable at a time when such an enormous 
opportunity for witness to people from other cultures and religions presents it-
self even within the borders of North America. 
A study group in the church or church school could examine one of these vol-
umes per quarter and explore the points of contact for the gospel in these tradi-
tions. 
Sandra S. Frankiel's volume on Christianity will help evangelical Christian 
readers discern what a cultural and descriptive perspective does with the Chris-
tian faith. How does one deal with the many manifestations of the Christian tra-
:lition without advocating one manifestation as the correct one? What do all 
1ave in common? Are the differences fairly treated? The Christian experience of 
:he volume on Christianity may also provide an indication of how adherents of 
he other traditions may react to the volumes dealing with their religions. 
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